Felis Troubleshooting Checklist

This file is the spec §28 #23 deliverable: a troubleshooting checklist for the failure modes the platform actually produces. Every symptom below is traced to a concrete signal — a status.conditions reason, an HTTP error code, a log string, or a manifest name — so an operator can map what they see to the code path that emitted it.

How to read this document

Each entry is symptom → likely cause → where to look → fix. The kubectl commands run as root on the node (sudo -i, or sudo k3s kubectl …): the admin kubeconfig /etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml is readable by root only (§13c). Signals are graded for how far the in-repo Go test suite proves the behaviour:

[GO-TESTED] — a hermetic *_test.go exercises this exact path; the string/code is asserted in CI.
[PG-TESTED] — a -tags pgint test in internal/pgint drives it against a real Postgres with the shipped migrations (CONTRIBUTING.md has the command).
[CODE-ONLY] — the code path and string exist and are real, but no unit test drives them (notably the Velocity Java plugin, which is not compiled or tested in this repo).
[INTEGRATION-ONLY] — the symptom is produced by the kubelet, kaniko, containerd, Postgres, or the network, not by Felis Go code; you will see it in kubectl describe / pod logs, never in MinecraftServer.status.
[INERT] — the configuration field exists in the CRD but no controller reads it. Tuning it does nothing. No CRD field carries this status today; the last one, spec.storage.retainOnDelete, was removed rather than implemented (§13 records why). A field whose change seems ignored is almost always a condition instead — §12 lists the fields that are read and the condition each depends on.

The operator never invents the parent domain; routing identity is spec.subdomain under the deployment zone. Examples below use <root-domain> / registry.<ns>.svc:<port> placeholders rather than any concrete host.

0. First look: `felis status`, `felis doctor`, `felis support-bundle`

Three read-only commands, all run as root on the node, give the state of the whole host before any of the sections below. They change nothing and mail nothing, so they are safe to run at any time.

sudo felis status prints the platform at a glance: the release, the node and its kubelet, each control-plane Deployment (ready replicas, image, pod restarts), the game proxy (the felis-velocity unit and whether the game port accepts connections), every server with its desired state, phase, players and newest world backup, the newest database bundle and the off-site copy, the watched disks and memory, and the alerts the watchdog has open. A part that is down reads as such and the rest still prints: with k3s stopped the cluster line says unreachable (...) and the servers unknown while the cluster is unreachable; with PostgreSQL down the backup column reads ? and a line under the table says why. [GO-TESTED: TestStatusReport, TestStatusWithPartsDown, TestStatusClusterEdges, TestStatusBackups, TestStatusWatchdog]

sudo felis doctor runs every check felis watchdog runs, with the settings felis-watchdog.service gives it, plus what only the host shows: a Felis unit that failed or a long-running one (k3s, felis-velocity) that stopped, a timer that no longer fires, alerts that reach no one (no [smtp] relay, no owner with a verified address), an unusable heartbeat URL. It prints one line per area, ✓ fine, ! warnings, ✗ something critical, - not checked and why (the off-site copy on an install without one), each finding with where to look next:

text

felis doctor on felis-1 at 2026-09-27 12:00 UTC
checks run as /etc/systemd/system/felis-watchdog.service runs them (config /etc/felis/felis.host.toml)

✓  configuration
✓  Kubernetes cluster
✗  PostgreSQL
     critical postgres: PostgreSQL is unreachable: sign-in, the panel and server management fail
              → k3s kubectl -n felis get pods -l app.kubernetes.io/component=postgres; k3s kubectl -n felis logs deploy/felis-postgres --tail=100 (...)
-  off-site copy: not checked, not configured
...
1 problem(s): 1 critical, 0 warning(s)

It exits 1 when it found anything and 0 otherwise, so a script can run it. It never mails, pings the heartbeat or touches the watchdog's state: an alert it shows is mailed by the watchdog's own next run, on the watchdog's delays (§14). A missing or unreadable felis-watchdog.service is itself a critical finding, and the checks then run with the watchdog's defaults. [GO-TESTED: TestDoctorReportsByArea, TestDoctorMailsPingsAndSavesNothing, TestDoctorWithoutUnitOrConfig, TestUnitFindings, TestPrintDoctorReport]

sudo felis support-bundle collects what someone helping needs into one file, /var/lib/felis/support/felis-support-<host>-<time>.tar.gz (mode 0600; -o DIR writes elsewhere): status.txt and doctor.txt, the release, a summary of the configuration (names and settings, no credentials), the Felis units and timers, df, addresses and memory, the names of the files under /etc/felis (no contents), each Felis unit's and k3s's journal (-since 48h, -log-lines 2000), the nodes, volumes and servers, and the pods, Deployments, StatefulSets, Jobs, CronJobs, Services, claims, network policies and events of the control-plane, build and server namespaces, and the tail of every control-plane and build container's log (and of its previous run after a restart). Game servers contribute their init containers' logs only; their own logs carry player names, IP addresses and chat, and -server-logs adds them.

What it leaves out: every Secret and ConfigMap, the contents of every configuration file, the database and every world. What it takes out of what it keeps: every value in the host's secret files (secrets.env, offsite.env, the relay and upload keys, the heartbeat URL, the forwarding secret, the proxy's token, the k3s tokens), the database password, every environment value in a pod spec or a server, passwords in URLs, private keys, Bearer/Basic credentials, and anything a log or report writes as password=, token=, secret= and the like. MANIFEST.txt inside lists what the bundle holds, what was taken out and what could not be collected (k3s down, a log that is gone). Read it through before sending the bundle anywhere: a secret logged in a form none of these rules knows stays in. [GO-TESTED: TestSupportBundle plants 25 secrets across every source and finds none in the bundle, TestSupportBundleWithTheClusterDown, TestSupportBundleServerLogs, TestScrubber]

1. Server is stuck in `Starting` and never becomes `Running`

MinecraftServer.status.phase stays Starting. A start that never succeeds is requeued every 2s until one of the two startup budgets expires, then escalated to Failed — StartupTimeout if the pod never passed TCP readiness, ReadinessTimeout if the RCON probe never succeeded. Both default to 300s when spec.startup.timeoutSeconds / spec.startup.readinessTimeoutSeconds are unset or 0, and both are measured from status.startRequestedAt. [GO-TESTED: TestReconcileRunning_StartupTimeoutConvertsToFailed, TestReconcileRunning_ReadinessTimeoutConvertsToFailed.]

So Starting seen once is normal and TestReconcileRunning_RconProbeFailureStaysStarting asserts exactly that — a single failed probe must not flap the phase. Starting seen for longer than the budget means the reconcile loop is not running at all; check the operator's own logs before tuning anything. Either way the underlying cause is diagnosed from pod state, not from MinecraftServer.status.

First, read the condition reason:

kubectl get minecraftserver <name> -o jsonpath='{.status.conditions}'

markStarting writes the same reason to both Ready=False and RconReached=False. The reason is one of:

`status.conditions[].reason`	Meaning	Requeue
`PodNotReady`	Pod not TCP-ready yet (`status.readyReplicas < 1`)	2s
`SpecChanged`	The spec changed while the pod was not ready; the operator recreated the pod from the new template (§1a)	2s
`AutoRestart` / `StartRetried`	A timed-out start was retried, automatically or from the panel, by recreating the pod	2s
`ServiceAddressPending`	The client Service has no ClusterIP yet	2s
`RconSecretUnavailable`	RCON secret missing or malformed	10s
`RconNotReachable`	RCON dial/auth failed	2s

[GO-TESTED for the reason set.]

1a. `PodNotReady` — pod never goes ready

The operator cannot tell why the pod is not ready; a broken image, an unbound PVC, and a backend that simply has not finished booting all surface as the identical PodNotReady signal. [GO-TESTED that the reason is emitted; [INTEGRATION-ONLY] for the underlying pod cause.] You must drop to the pod:

kubectl get pod -l app.kubernetes.io/name=<name>
kubectl describe pod <pod>     # look at Events + container State

ImagePullBackOff / ErrImagePull → spec.image is wrong, the tag does not exist, or the registry is unreachable. spec.image is copied verbatim into the container with zero validation by the operator. Fix the image reference, or see §7 (registry reachability) and §6 (build push target). Editing the spec is enough, even once the server is Failed with its retries spent: the StatefulSet (OrderedReady) never rolls a pod that is not ready, so the operator deletes a not-ready <name>-0 made from an older template itself and the StatefulSet recreates it from the new one. The server goes back to Starting with reason SpecChanged, a fresh start timeout and its restart budget at zero, and the MinecraftServer gets a PodReplaced Event. [GO-TESTED: TestSpecChangeReplacesAPodThatGaveUp, TestStalePodReplacement.]
PVC Pending → kubectl get pvc -l app.kubernetes.io/name=<name>. A nonexistent spec.storage.storageClassName, or a request larger than any class can satisfy, leaves the PVC unbound. The operator does not error on this (only a malformed quantity errors — §2); it waits in Starting indefinitely. Fix the StorageClass name or capacity. [INTEGRATION-ONLY.]
Container crash-looping before the readiness port opens → check container logs; this is a backend/entrypoint problem, not a Felis problem.
Stuck in Init: or AccessDeniedException / Permission denied in the log → the pod runs as uid/gid 1000 (naming.GameUID) with every capability dropped, whatever USER the image declares. Before the server starts, the prepare-data initContainer (felis init-volume, root with only CHOWN + DAC_OVERRIDE) hands every world entry not yet owned by 1000:1000 to that uid, so a world written by an older root-run release or extracted by a restore Job is fixed on its next start: kubectl logs <pod> -c prepare-data prints how many entries it changed and lists up to 20 it could not. An image that writes outside /data and /tmp (a directory baked into the image as root) cannot run as uid 1000; rebuild it to keep its state under /data. [GO-TESTED: TestBuildStatefulSetRunsGameAsNonRoot, TestChownTreeHandsOverMismatchedEntries; INTEGRATION-ONLY for the walk on a live volume.]
Every start sits about 30 s in its last Init: step → the egress-gate initContainer (felis egress-gate) holds the server image until the pod's egress fence (felis-server-egress) is in effect: kube-router programs a new pod's policy a moment after it starts, and a server-labelled pod reached felis-api's internal face on its first request. It dials the Kubernetes API Service, which no server is admitted to, and normally passes within a second. kubectl logs <pod> -c egress-gate says which way it went:
```
felis egress-gate: 10.43.0.1:443 is unreachable after 201ms (...); the egress lock is in effect
felis egress-gate: 10.43.0.1:443 still answers after 30s; starting anyway. ...
```
The second line means the probe answered for the whole wait. Either the cluster runs without NetworkPolicy enforcement (a CNI without it, or k3s started with --disable-network-policy), which leaves every server off the fence, or a --server-egress-allow-cidr covers the node the API Service leads to, which admits servers to the node's PostgreSQL and kube API port as well. Narrow the CIDR to the host the servers need. The gate lets the server start after the wait either way, where the build's gate refuses. [GO-TESTED: TestBuildStatefulSetGatesEgress, TestEgressGateFailOpenWaitsThenWarns. VM-TESTED on k3s: without the gate a server-labelled pod's first request reached felis-api-internal:8081; behind it, three pods' first requests were refused after gates of about 200 ms, and a pod no policy selects started after the 5 s wait it was given, with the warning.]
FailedCreate … violates PodSecurity "baseline" on the StatefulSet or a Job → the minecraft namespace enforces the PodSecurity baseline profile (pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=baseline, set by the install bundle). Everything Felis renders there fits it; a pod that is refused was edited or created outside Felis (hostPath, hostPort, privileged, extra capabilities). kubectl get events -n minecraft --field-selector reason=FailedCreate names the field. [GO-TESTED: TestObjects_MinecraftNamespaceEnforcesBaseline.]

1b. `RconSecretUnavailable` — RCON secret missing or malformed

The probe needs the RCON password from spec.rcon.secretRef. The message is the verbatim error: [CODE-ONLY for these branches]

rcon.secretRef.name and .key are required when rcon is enabled — you enabled spec.rcon.enabled but left secretRef.name or secretRef.key empty.
secret "<name>" has no key "<key>" — the Secret exists but lacks the named key.

Fix: create the Secret with the referenced key, or correct secretRef. Verify:

kubectl get secret <secretRef.name> -o jsonpath='{.data.<key>}' | base64 -d | wc -c

1c. `RconNotReachable` — RCON dial or auth failed

The probe is a TCP connect plus RCON auth handshake, then immediate close — no command is ever run; a successful auth IS the entire readiness gate. The message is the verbatim dial error:

rcon: authentication failed → the password in the Secret does not match the backend's rcon.password. Reconcile the two. [GO-TESTED that this maps to RconNotReachable.]
connection refused / i/o timeout → the backend has not opened the RCON port yet, RCON is disabled in server.properties, or the image listens on a port other than 25575 (the CRD accepts only that one for spec.rcon.port, operations.md §4). [INTEGRATION-ONLY for the live handshake.]

The per-probe timeout is a fixed 5s in code (prober.go:45, shortened further if the reconcile context has a nearer deadline). It is not derived from spec.startup.readinessTimeoutSeconds, which is the deadline for the whole start, not for one probe — see §12.

2. Server is in `Failed`

Read the condition reason first. InvalidSpec means the StatefulSet could not be built, usually because spec.storage.size is not a valid resource quantity:

invalid storage size "<value>": <parse error>

Both Ready=False and Provisioned=False carry InvalidSpec. Use a valid quantity such as 10Gi, not 10 GB; the next reconcile leaves this failure state. [CODE-ONLY for this specific branch; the reconciler fixture normally uses a valid size.]

Startup and readiness deadlines also produce StartupTimeout and ReadinessTimeout (§1), so Failed does not always mean a spec error. markFailed does not clear status.endpoint: a previously running server may retain endpoint.mode=direct. The proxy must confirm phase=Running before routing direct (§4).

3. Players can't join / get sent to the wrong place

Routing is driven by status.endpoint:

markRunningReady is the only writer of endpoint.mode=direct (address=<game address>), and only while phase=Running and RCON-ready.
markStarting, markStopping, markStopped all write endpoint.mode=fallback, address=spec.fallbackServer.

So the proxy should route direct only when phase=Running; otherwise it gets a fallback endpoint. [GO-TESTED for the direct/fallback toggle via markRunningReady/markStopped.]

Two pitfalls:

spec.fallbackServer is empty → the fallback endpoint address is "", so during Starting/Stopping/Stopped the proxy has no lobby to park the player in. Set spec.fallbackServer to a registered Velocity server name.
Stale direct after Failed → see §2; the proxy must not honour a direct endpoint unless phase=Running.

3a. Wake-on-join is refused, slow, or rate-limited

When a player joins a stopped server, the proxy parks them in the fallback and calls the internal wake API. The authorization gate order is autostartPolicy → per-server cooldown → global running cap. Map the API result:

HTTP	Code	Cause	Fix
`403`	`forbidden`	`autostartPolicy=allowlist` and UUID not allowlisted, or `ownerOnly` and caller is not owner	Add the UUID / claim the server / set `autostartPolicy=public`
`409`	`maintenance_in_progress`	A restore, backup or file change holds the server's world volume (§3b)	Wait for the Job to finish
`409`	`world_reclaiming`	The idle reaper is archiving the world (§3b item 3); afterwards the server is released with an empty world	Nothing to wait for; the old world stays in the archive
`429`	(cooldown)	Wake retried within the 30s per-server `WakeCooldown`	Wait out the cooldown
`503`	`at_capacity`	Global `MaxRunningServers` cap reached	Stop another server or raise the cap

[GO-TESTED: handlers_internal_wake_test.go, cooldown, running-cap shape.] The operator's RCON probe — not the wake call — is the authoritative readiness gate; the proxy polls GET /api/v1/internal/servers/{name}/status every ~2s and teleports when ready=true.

The Velocity-side consumption of these codes (403 → "You're not allowed to start «server»"; 409 maintenance_in_progress → "«server» is under maintenance", not queued; 409 world_reclaiming → "«server» sat idle too long and its world is being archived", not queued; 429 → re-queue; other → "Couldn't start … Try again shortly.") lives in the Java plugin and is [CODE-ONLY] — the codes it reacts to are produced by the Go-tested authorizeWakeByUUID / cooldown limiter, so grade the two halves separately.

3b. Wake, restore, backup or file change refused with `maintenance_in_progress`

A server's world volume is ReadWriteOnce, and on a single node RWO lets a game pod and a restore Job mount it side by side. So felis-api serialises them per server: a restore, a backup, a world download or a file change takes the world, and until its Job finishes every wake (panel or join) and every other world operation on that server gets 409 maintenance_in_progress. File reads and listings never hold it. The operator applies the same rule when desiredState is flipped to Running by anything other than felis-api: the StatefulSet is not scaled up, and the Ready condition reads MaintenanceInProgress until the Job ends.

What holds the world, in order:

An unfinished Job labelled felis.lolicon.best/server=<name> with app.kubernetes.io/managed-by felis-restore, felis-backup, felis-files with any felis.lolicon.best/files-mode but list or read (a save, new file, new folder, rename, delete or upload; §18), or felis-export with any felis.lolicon.best/export-mode but backup (a world download, held until the download ends; §10):
sh
```
kubectl -n minecraft get jobs -l felis.lolicon.best/server=<name>
```
A Job that is genuinely wedged is ended by its own activeDeadlineSeconds; deleting it by hand releases the world at once (kubectl -n minecraft delete job <job>), at the cost of whatever it was writing.
The admission lock felis.lolicon.best/maintenance=<kind>@<RFC3339> on the MinecraftServer. felis-api sets it for the milliseconds between admitting an operation and creating its Job; it holds for at most two minutes if felis-api died in between, and the next wake clears a stale one. To drop it by hand:
sh
```
kubectl -n minecraft annotate minecraftserver <name> felis.lolicon.best/maintenance-
```
The idle-world reaper (§10), which has no Job of its own: it writes the same annotation as reap@<RFC3339> while it archives and deletes an idle world, and rewrites it every 30 seconds, so the lock stays fresh however long the archive takes. The refusal names the idle-world reaper. A reaper pod that dies mid-archive stops rewriting it, and the lock lapses two minutes after the last write. Dropping it by hand also ends the reap: the reaper checks the lock before it deletes the world volume, keeps the world and retries the next day.

A restore, backup or file change refused with 409 not_stopped although the panel shows Stopped means the game pod is still terminating (its shutdown save can take a while); retry once kubectl -n minecraft get pods -l felis.lolicon.best/server=<name> shows nothing.

A stop that leaves the server Running for about 30 s is the players' warning. When desiredState turns Stopped and the RCON tally does not say the server is empty, the operator sends everyone online a yellow chat line (tellraw @a), stamps status.stopNoticeAt, records a StopNotice Event, and scales down once StopNoticeWindow (30 s) has passed, with a last "stopping now" line before the save. Starting the server again inside the window calls the stop off, and the players are told so. An empty server, RCON off, or a probe or broadcast that fails stops at once. Idle auto-stop only fires on an empty server, so it never waits.

[GO-TESTED: internal/maintenance, k8scluster_maintenance_test.go, handlers_maintenance_test.go, operator maintenance_test.go, stopnotice_test.go.]

4. Routing is disabled even though servers are up (online-mode coupling)

Wake/claim/allowlist semantics trust Mojang-verified online-mode UUIDs. If the proxy runs online-mode=false, those identities are spoofable, so the Velocity plugin refuses to activate routing:

Felis routing DISABLED: the proxy is in offline mode (online-mode=false).
Domain autostart and the allowlist trust Mojang-verified UUIDs; refusing to
route on spoofable identities. /link remains available. Set online-mode=true to
enable routing.

[CODE-ONLY — FelisVelocityPlugin.onProxyInitialize.] /link still works (account binding does not depend on routing), but no domain autostart happens. The summary line prints routing: disabled (offline mode) or (no root-domain set). Fix: set online-mode=true on the proxy, or configure the root domain if the log says no root-domain set.

On the server side, spec.autostartPolicy and spec.onlineMode are documented as only meaningful when the proxy enforces online-mode=true. Setting them does not by itself make an offline proxy safe — the proxy guard is the enforcement point.

5. Web panel returns 401 / 403 (Zero-Trust / Cloudflare Access)

The external face has one credential: the felis_session cookie the sign-in doors mint. Cloudflare Access, when the install sits behind it, is enforced at the Cloudflare edge only — felis-api does not read the Cf-Access-Jwt-Assertion header, so a request that reaches the origin some other way still has to sign in, and the account and its role always come from the users table. The edge setup fences the panel NodePort to loopback (the felis_edge nftables table), so every request reaches the API through cloudflared and Access stays in front of the operator console; check nft list table inet felis_edge if you doubt it. The error envelope is always {"error":{"code","message","request_id"}}. [GO-TESTED.]

401 unauthorized — no valid session cookie. [GO-TESTED.]
403 forbidden — authenticated but not permitted (e.g. a non-admin principal hitting an admin route; IsAdmin() requires a staff role and a request on the operator console host). [GO-TESTED.]

5a. Staff routes 403 on a local IP URL

The operator console is recognised by the request's host: admin_hostname (default op.console.<root_domain>). A bare IP counts only when the install names it — the address a <ip>.nip.io / <ip>.sslip.io root domain embeds (the local panel URL felis setup prints), or an admin_hostname set to that IP. Any other address, loopback included, is served as the player console, so a staff account signed in at https://127.0.0.1:30443 through an SSH tunnel gets 403 on admin routes. Open the console by its hostname instead (an /etc/hosts entry or curl --resolve pointing it at the tunnel), or set [auth] admin_hostname to the IP you use. [GO-TESTED]

Local sessions use the felis_session cookie (HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite=Lax, 12h TTL, host-only). They are gated by the local_auth_enabled row in platform_settings, read live per request and fail-closed (missing or unparseable → treated as disabled). Symptoms:

Cookie present but login rejected with local auth disabled → the local_auth_enabled setting is false/absent. A present cookie under disabled local-auth is rejected outright.
invalid session: … → bad/forged session hash.

Fix: set local_auth_enabled=true in platform_settings if local password auth is intended. [GO-TESTED for the session/QR-login logic.]

6. Internal API rejects Velocity / proxy callers (service-token)

The internal face (--internal-addr :8081, routes under /api/v1/internal/...) is never Zero-Trust; it authenticates a bearer token (Authorization: Bearer <token>, compared in constant time). Each internal caller has its own token, and each route serves only the callers listed for it (x-felis-callers in docs/openapi.yaml):

Caller	Secret (key `token`)	API env	Where the caller reads it	Routes
`velocity` (proxy felis-link)	`felis/felis-service-token`	`FELIS_SERVICE_TOKEN`	`service-token` in the host's `felis-link.properties`	server list, wake/claim/ready/status, join events, menu, op-login, migrate, reclaim, link codes, blacklist
`limbo` (login gate)	`felis/felis-limbo-token`, replica in `minecraft`	`FELIS_LIMBO_TOKEN`	login pod env `FELIS_SERVICE_TOKEN`	link codes, link status, blacklist
`build` (build Job fetch)	`felis/felis-build-token`, replica in `felis-build`	`FELIS_BUILD_TOKEN`	fetch initContainer env	submission build context
`ops` (`felis backup-now`)	`felis/felis-ops-token`	`FELIS_OPS_TOKEN`	read from the Secret on each run	break-glass backup

The installer generates all four into /etc/felis/secrets.env (SERVICE_TOKEN, LIMBO_TOKEN, BUILD_TOKEN, OPS_TOKEN) and applies them on every run. The audit log records internal actions with the source internal:<caller>. [GO-TESTED]

In-cluster it is reached through the ClusterIP Service felis-api-internal (port 8081), which is separate from the external NodePort felis-api (443) precisely so the no-Zero-Trust face is never exposed on a node. On the control-plane node the break-glass console reaches it by resolving that Service's ClusterIP and dialing :8081.

The face speaks plain HTTP, and the tokens cross it in the clear. That holds up because no hop leaves the node: the proxy runs on the node and dials the ClusterIP, and the login pod and the build Job are pods on the same node, so reading the traffic takes root there, which also reads the tokens from disk. Pods reach the face only where a policy opens it: felis-login-to-internal-api for the login pod and felis-build-egress for the build Job; felis-server-egress keeps every other game server (lobby included) off all private ranges, 8081 among them. A Velocity on another host would put the velocity token on the wire, which is one more reason the proxy belongs on the node (§1 of docs/operations.md); a multi-node shape would need TLS on this face first.

Internal calls fail to connect (not 401) → the felis-api-internal Service is missing or its selector no longer matches the api pods. kubectl -n felis get svc felis-api-internal must show a ClusterIP with 8081; a bare felis-api name serves only 443 and every internal call would hang/refuse.
One caller's calls all 401 → its token is unset or differs from the api's copy. The api logs one line per unset token at startup:
```
felis api: warning: FELIS_LIMBO_TOKEN unset — the internal face turns the limbo caller away
```
An unset token never matches anything (no bypass). Compare the caller's value with its Secret, e.g. for the proxy:
```
kubectl -n felis get secret felis-service-token -o jsonpath='{.data.token}' | base64 -d
```
403 wrong_caller → the token is valid but belongs to a caller that route does not serve, e.g. the build token calling a proxy route. Configure the caller with its own token from the table above.
api pods stuck in CreateContainerConfigError → one of the four Secrets is missing in felis. Re-run the installer; it applies them before the bundle.
Two tokens with the same value → felis api refuses to start with the X and Y tokens are the same value; each caller needs its own, since a shared value would make the caller ambiguous. Rotate one of them.

Rotating a token

sudo felis rotate-token <kind> replaces one credential the installer generated. Without -yes it only prints what it would write and what that interrupts; sudo felis rotate-token -yes <kind> rotates. Every rotation writes the new value into /etc/felis/secrets.env first, so whatever fails after that, a re-run of the installer (sudo bash deploy/bootstrap.sh) puts the value everywhere. [GO-TESTED]

kind	replaces	interrupts
`velocity`	the proxy's token: Secret `felis-service-token`, `service-token` in the host proxy's `felis-link.properties`	felis-api restarts (one replica: the panel, sign-in and the proxy's calls stop for a few seconds). The proxy re-reads its file and keeps its players
`limbo`	the login gate's token, `felis-limbo-token` and its minecraft replica	felis-api restarts, then the login pod
`build`	the build Jobs' token, `felis-build-token` and its build-namespace replica	felis-api restarts; a build fetching its context at that moment fails and can be submitted again
`ops`	`felis backup-now`'s token, `felis-ops-token`	felis-api restarts
`registry`	the registry's `platform`, `build` and `prune` write tokens: Secret `felis-registry-auth`, the build Jobs' `felis-registry-push`	the registry restarts (a push at that moment fails, a pull retries), then felis-api
`forwarding`	the Velocity forwarding secret: `/opt/felis/velocity/forwarding.secret`, Secret `felis-forwarding-secret` in both namespaces	every running server restarts (saving its world) and the proxy restarts: everyone online is disconnected
`db`	the database role's password: the role in felis-postgres, `[database] url` in `felis.host.toml` and `felis.pod.toml`, Secret `felis-config` in both namespaces	felis-api restarts; a backup, restore or file Job that connects in those seconds fails and can be run again

velocity — the rotation waits for the proxy's log line Felis: service-token reloaded from … (fingerprint <12 hex digits>). A proxy that has not logged it within 60 s of felis-api's restart (a plugin from before this release) is restarted, which disconnects everyone online. The file keeps its modification time, so felis domain check does not read the proxy as stale. A proxy on another host is left alone: set service-token in its felis-link.properties to the value in Secret felis/felis-service-token, and it takes it within a few seconds.
forwarding — a server whose world a backup, restore or file change holds is left running and named in the plan and the output; players cannot join it until it restarts, so stop and start it from the panel once that finishes. The next installer run restarts the proxy once more (its record of what the proxy was started from predates the rotation); an upgrade restarts it for the new plugin jar anyway. A proxy on another host needs the value in Secret felis/felis-forwarding-secret in its forwarding secret file, and a restart.
db — the password reaches PostgreSQL as a SCRAM-SHA-256 verifier, never as text a failed statement could log. The config copies change only after a connection with the new password succeeds; when it does not, the command stops and says so, and the installer re-run sets the password from secrets.env in the role and every copy. A database the installer does not run ([database] deployment unset) is refused: change its password where it runs, then in each copy's [database] url. felis.pod.toml must be a file of its own, since the pods reach the database at another address.
The old value stops working as felis-api (or the registry) restarts; a caller still presenting it is turned away until it has the new one.

7. Account-link and claim API errors

Codes from handlers_account.go / handlers_internal.go. [GO-TESTED.]

HTTP	Code	When
`400`	`bad_request`	Missing `mc_uuid`, empty code, or invalid `auth_source` (must be `mojang`/`thirdparty`)
`400`	`invalid_code`	Link code unknown or expired (10-min TTL, 8-symbol code)
`409`	`already_linked`	That MC UUID is already linked to another user
`412`	`not_linked`	Claim/owner op by a caller with no verified account link
`403`	`quota_exceeded`	Claim would exceed the user's server quota
`409`	`already_claimed`	Atomic `UPDATE … WHERE owner_id IS NULL` affected 0 rows
`404`	`not_found`	Unknown server/resource

Flow reminder: the code is minted in-game on the internal face (POST /api/v1/internal/account/link/code, proves the UUID) and verified on the web external face (POST /api/v1/account/link/verify, proves the user). A 409 already_linked rolls the transaction back and preserves the code so a different user can still use it. The claim's race-safety is the single conditional UPDATE under READ COMMITTED — 1 row → 200, 0 rows → 409. The handler logic is [GO-TESTED] through an in-memory fake repository. See Integration boundaries for the real-database verification scope.

8. Image build fails (Kaniko, spec §14/§16)

8a. Build push rejected at submission with `400`

Pre-build validation rejects any push target that is not the internal registry:

must target the internal registry "<registry.<ns>.svc:<port>>", not "<your-target>"

[GO-TESTED via the validate gate.] Fix the image reference to push to cfg.Registry.URL (the internal registry — §9).

8b. Build Job's ServiceAccount can do nothing (RBAC "denial" by design)

The build/restore Job SAs (felis-build, felis-restore, namespace felis-build) have no Role and no RoleBinding anywhere — isolation is the absence of permissions (spec §16/§21). If you see the build SA denied a namespaced API operation, that is correct, not a misconfiguration. [GO-TESTED that the rendered manifests give these SAs no Role.] Do not "fix" it by granting the build SA permissions.

8c. Build hangs then fails fetching base image / packages

The build namespace runs a default-deny egress NetworkPolicy (felis-build-egress); the only allowed egress is the package-mirror CIDRs from --package-cidr, which defaults to none (fail-closed, no internet). [GO-TESTED for the netpol shape.] A kaniko run that hangs pulling a base image or OS package from a non-allowlisted host is the egress policy doing its job — the hang/failure text comes from kaniko/containerd and is [INTEGRATION-ONLY]. Fix: add the mirror CIDR via --package-cidr, or pre-stage the base image in the internal registry.

8d. Build reaches `Failed` phase

reconcileBuilds polls the Job; a Job reaching Failed is surfaced via writeBuildError (JobPhase→Failed). [GO-TESTED for the mapping.] The build's error names the cause: the step that failed with the last lines of its output, the deadline, or the scan verdict (spec §16). The pod runs egress-gate (§8f), context-fetch, kaniko (builds a tarball, never pushes), trivy (writes the full JSON report of that tarball), sbom (converts the report to a CycloneDX SBOM) and scan-gate (applies the scan policy) as init containers, then push — so an image the scan blocks never reaches the registry. Inspect every step:

kubectl logs -n felis-build job/<build-job> --all-containers --prefix

A push that fails with 403 means the target repository is under felis/ or mirror/ — the registry gate reserves those for the platform (§9); 401 means the felis-registry-push Secret in felis-build is missing or stale (re-run the installer).

The scan gate. scan-gate blocks the image when a vulnerability or a leaked secret has a severity listed in [registry] scan_fail_on (§8e; default CRITICAL). A vulnerability with no fixed release is listed without blocking unless scan_fail_unfixed = true, since nothing can be upgraded to clear it. A blocked build ends with an error such as:

the scan blocked the image: 1 CRITICAL, 1 HIGH (CVE-2026-12345, CVE-2025-24813)

HIGH is opt-in because the platform's own felis/paper image carries five fixable HIGH findings inside upstream paper.jar (its bundled commons-compress 1.5 and plexus-utils 3.5.1). Adding HIGH to scan_fail_on blocks every build FROM it until those ids are accepted as known risks in scan_accept:

toml

scan_fail_on = ["CRITICAL", "HIGH"]
scan_accept = ["CVE-2021-35515", "CVE-2021-35516", "CVE-2021-35517", "CVE-2021-36090", "CVE-2025-67030"]

An accepted id (a CVE, GHSA or similar advisory id, or a secret rule id such as aws-access-key-id) never blocks; its findings are still counted, listed and marked Accepted on the panel, and scan-gate's log names the accepted ids. Review the list whenever the base image is upgraded.

felis-api keeps each finished build's scan: the verdict, up to 100 findings with the blocking ones first, the full Trivy report and the SBOM. On the panel, Build Pipeline → Scan & logs on a finished build shows them, with both files to download. The API serves the same data (admin only):

Endpoint	Returns
`GET /api/v1/images/build/{id}/scan`	the verdict and findings; `404 scan_not_found` for a build that stopped before the scan or ran before builds kept scans
`GET /api/v1/images/build/{id}/scan/report`	the Trivy JSON report as `<id>-trivy.json`
`GET /api/v1/images/build/{id}/sbom`	the CycloneDX SBOM as `<id>.cdx.json`

The report and SBOM travel to felis-api inside the scan-gate container's log, so one image gets at most 6 MiB of them compressed. Past that the gate drops the SBOM first, then the report, says so in its log, and the download answers 404 scan_document_not_kept; the verdict and findings are always kept. A scan-gate exit 2 means the report was missing or unreadable; the build fails closed and the error says why.

A scan reflects the vulnerability DB on the day of the build. An admitted image is not scanned again when the DB learns of a new CVE; to rescan it, start a new build of the same context (POST /api/v1/images/build), after felis mirror-build-tools -only trivy-db if the DB copy is old (§8e).

8e. Build Pods never start: executor images and the scan DBs

A build Job runs Kaniko and Trivy, and Trivy reads two databases: the vulnerability DB and, for any image with Java artifacts (every real modpack), the Java DB. The build namespace has no internet egress, so all four come from the internal registry, under mirror/:

Tool	Upstream	Copy
kaniko	`gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.24.0@sha256:4e7a52dd…`	`mirror/kaniko-executor:v1.24.0`
trivy	`ghcr.io/aquasecurity/trivy:0.74.0@sha256:62b1e65e…`	`mirror/trivy:0.74.0`
vulnerability DB	`mirror.gcr.io/aquasec/trivy-db:2`	`mirror/trivy-db:2`
Java DB	`mirror.gcr.io/aquasec/trivy-java-db:1`	`mirror/trivy-java-db:1`

The executor images are pinned by digest (internal/build/tools.go), so a moved upstream tag never changes what a build runs; the DBs follow their tag. The installer copies all four with felis mirror-build-tools, and felis-build-tools.timer repeats the copy at 04:00 and 16:00, which is what keeps the DBs current. The watchdog mails a warning when three days pass without a clean run: scans still gate, but against old advisories.

Symptom	Cause	Fix
Build Pods in `ImagePullBackOff` on `mirror/kaniko-executor` or `mirror/trivy`	the first copy has not finished, or the node had no internet during install	`journalctl -u felis-build-tools -n 50`; `sudo felis mirror-build-tools` once the node can reach gcr.io, ghcr.io and mirror.gcr.io
Scan fails with `failed to download vulnerability DB`	`mirror/trivy-db:2` is missing	same
Watchdog: `the vulnerability DB was last refreshed … ago`	the timer's runs fail (network, registry down, disk)	read the error in the mail or in `/var/lib/felis/build-tools/status.json`; `sudo felis mirror-build-tools` to retry now

sudo felis mirror-build-tools -only trivy-db refreshes one tool. The copy is single-platform (the node's architecture), written as the platform principal through the loopback hostPort with the token from /etc/felis/secrets.env.

An air-gapped node cannot fetch anything. Copy the four references above into the registry from a machine that can (kubectl -n felis port-forward svc/registry 5000:5000, then push to localhost:5000/mirror/... as platform, password kubectl -n felis get secret felis-registry-auth -o jsonpath='{.data.platform}' | base64 -d), and repeat that for the DBs as often as advisories matter to you. The watchdog warning stays until the timer can reach upstream; that is accurate.

The platform's own images on an air-gapped node. The registry pod and the database pod run images from Docker Hub by digest (REGISTRY_IMAGE and POSTGRES_IMAGE in bootstrap.sh), which the installer imports into k3s's containerd from the release's felis-image-base-linux-<arch>.tar (or, without one, pulls) and pins there so the kubelet's image GC never collects them. On an air-gapped node the simplest way is to install from the release's assets copied to the node (FELIS_ARTIFACT_DIR, operations §1). When the pull fails (could not pull …) and no release assets are at hand, fetch the same digest on a machine that can, for the node's architecture, keeping the manifest as it is, and import it on the node:

# elsewhere: the reference as bootstrap.sh names it, e.g. docker.io/library/postgres:18.6-trixie@sha256:…
sudo ctr images pull --platform linux/arm64 "$ref"
sudo ctr images export --platform linux/arm64 image.tar "$ref"
# on the node:
sudo k3s ctr images import image.tar

A docker save of the image rewrites its manifest, so its copy never matches the digest the Deployment names. Rerun the installer afterwards; it finds the image and pins it. [CODE-ONLY]

Kaniko is archived upstream (June 2025); v1.24.0 is its last release and gets no security fixes. To run a maintained fork, copy it under mirror/ and point the override at it. The other [registry] keys in felis.toml:

toml

[registry]
url = "registry.felis.svc:5000"
build_namespace = "felis-build"
kaniko_image = ""                  # empty: the mirror/ copy above
trivy_image = ""
trivy_db_repository = ""
trivy_java_db_repository = ""
scan_fail_on = ["CRITICAL"]        # §8d: severities that block; any case; empty = CRITICAL
scan_fail_unfixed = false          # §8d: true blocks on vulnerabilities with no fixed release too
scan_accept = []                   # §8d: vulnerability or secret rule ids accepted as known risks; never block
build_cpu_limit = "2"
build_mem_limit = "4Gi"
build_disk_limit = "12Gi"          # §8f
build_user_namespaces = "auto"     # §8f: auto | on | off
build_runtime_class = ""           # §8f: e.g. "gvisor"
max_concurrent_builds = 2          # §8f: 1-6; later builds queue
user_uploads_max_bytes = "4Gi"     # every user's uploaded contexts together; 507 uploads_full past it
context_max_bytes = "1Gi"          # one uploaded context; empty = 1Gi (sent in 32 MiB parts, so the Cloudflare edge's 100 MB body cap does not bind)

Put them in both /etc/felis/felis.host.toml (host-side CLI) and /etc/felis/felis.pod.toml (the file rendered into the API's felis-config Secret — the two differ only in the database URL; the setup screens re-render the Secret from the pod file, so edits made only through kubectl on the live Secret are lost at the next reconfigure). A Deployment restart alone is NOT enough — the API Pod mounts the Secret, never the host file. Re-render the Secret from the pod file, then roll felis-api:

kubectl -n felis create secret generic felis-config \
  --from-file=felis.toml=/etc/felis/felis.pod.toml --dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f -
kubectl -n felis rollout restart deployment/felis-api

Unset fields keep the defaults. The Job's Trivy container runs with --insecure, so the internal registry's plain HTTP works for the DB pulls; reads need no credential. The registry pruner keeps every tool reference the api resolves (§9).

8f. Build isolation model and residual risk

A Dockerfile's RUN steps execute inside the kaniko container, as root. Kaniko is a daemonless image builder; it is not a sandbox. What stands between an approved-but-hostile Dockerfile and the node is the pod around it:

Layer	What it does	Where
Admin approval	Nothing builds until an administrator approves the submission	submit lane
Reviewed bytes	the approval names the context's sha256; a re-upload after review fails the approval, and the build refuses any other bytes	submit lane, `felis fetch-context`
Weak identity	`felis-build` SA, no Role anywhere, no token mounted	§8b
Egress lock	`felis-build-egress`: cluster DNS, the registry, the api internal face, nothing else	§8c
Egress gate	first init container; holds the pod until the lock is enforced for it	`felis egress-gate`
Capabilities	every container drops ALL; kaniko gets back only CHOWN, DAC_OVERRIDE, FOWNER to unpack base images	jobspec
seccomp	the whole pod runs under the runtime's default profile (no `unshare`, `mount`, `keyctl`, `bpf`, …)	jobspec
User namespace	with `build_user_namespaces` on, root in the pod is an unprivileged uid on the node	below
Sandbox runtime	optional `build_runtime_class` (gVisor, Kata)	below
Credentials	the registry credential lives only in the `push` container; the service token only in `context-fetch`	jobspec
Scan gate	the image's Trivy report is judged under `scan_fail_on` before `push` runs; a blocked or unreadable scan keeps the image out of the registry	`felis scan-gate`, §8d
Resources	CPU, memory and ephemeral-storage limits per container; `activeDeadlineSeconds`; the context extraction stops at 4 GiB or 200 000 entries	jobspec, `felis fetch-context`
Namespace backstop	`felis-build-limits` LimitRange gives any container without limits 1 CPU / 1 GiB / 1 GiB disk; `felis-build-quota` allows 8 running pods and no PVCs	bundle
Concurrency	at most `[registry] max_concurrent_builds` (default 2, at most 6) builds run; later ones wait as `pending` (Queued) and start oldest first	`build.Builder`

Reviewed bytes. Every upload records the sha256 of the archive, and the review page shows it. The context download carries the same value in the X-Felis-Context-Sha256 header; the API cuts the transfer off if the stored bytes no longer match it. Approving sends that digest back as expected_digest, and the approval fails with 409 context_changed when the submitter has uploaded again since: download and review the new upload. The approved digest is pinned on the build, and felis fetch-context --sha256 hashes every byte it receives; a mismatch fails the build before Kaniko starts:

felis fetch-context: the context's sha256 is 3f…, the approved digest is 9a…: it changed after approval; refusing to build

The panel approves with the digest of the file it downloaded in the same session. When the review happened elsewhere (a CLI download, another browser), it approves with the digest the list shows, so compare that value with sha256sum of the file you actually read. A submission uploaded before digests were recorded cannot be approved until the submitter uploads it again.

Egress gate. The CNI programs a new pod's NetworkPolicy a moment after the pod starts. On k3s (kube-router), a pod in felis-build could reach the internet and the Kubernetes API for its first ~0.7 s. egress-gate dials the Kubernetes API Service, which the build policy never admits, and exits once it stops answering. The build pod log shows the wait:

felis egress-gate: 10.43.0.1:443 is unreachable after 612ms (...); the egress lock is in effect

If the probe still answers after two minutes the gate exits 1 and the build fails: the build namespace's NetworkPolicy is not enforced. The cluster is running without NetworkPolicy enforcement (a CNI without it, or k3s started with --disable-network-policy); fix the cluster, not the gate.

User namespaces (build_user_namespaces). With hostUsers: false, uid 0 in the build pod maps to an unprivileged uid range on the node, so a container escape lands as nobody. It needs Kubernetes ≥ 1.33, containerd 2.x, and a kernel with idmapped mounts on the node filesystem (5.19+ upstream; the RHEL/CentOS Stream 9 kernels carry the backport). auto, the default, lets felis-api decide at startup: it runs one userns-probe-* Job in felis-build and turns the feature on only when that pod ran. The api log says which way it went:

felis api: build pods run in a user namespace (hostUsers: false)
felis api: build pods run without a user namespace: this node cannot start a pod with hostUsers: false

on forces it (builds then fail to start on a node that cannot do it), off never uses it.

Sandbox runtime (build_runtime_class). Naming a RuntimeClass runs build pods under it, for example gVisor (runsc) or Kata. The class must exist (kubectl get runtimeclass), and kaniko must work under it: gVisor needs its default overlay2 rootfs, and Kata needs nested virtualization on a VM node. Leave it empty unless you have installed and tested one.

Disk (build_disk_limit, default 12Gi). This caps kaniko's writable layer (the unpacked base image) and, as the largest limit in the pod, the pod's total disk: extracted context, unpacked base image and image tarball together. The kubelet enforces it by eviction on its housekeeping sweep, so a build that runs past it is killed within seconds. The build then fails with Evicted in kubectl -n felis-build describe pod. Raise it for very large modpacks, and keep the node's free disk above it.

Residual risk. Without a user namespace or a sandbox runtime, the build runs as root in a container on the same kernel as the game servers and the control plane. Seccomp and the dropped capabilities remove the common escape primitives. A kernel vulnerability reachable through the remaining syscalls still reaches the node, and on a single-node install the node is the whole platform. Admin approval is the control that remains: read the Dockerfile and download the context before approving. On a node where the probe comes back negative, a kernel upgrade that brings idmapped mounts is the cheapest hardening available.

9. Registry push/pull failures (spec §15)

The in-cluster registry is Deployment/Service/PVC named registry in the control namespace (or --registry-namespace):

Push/pull target (the exact string to match):registry.<ns>.svc:<port> (port from --registry-port, default 5000; e.g. --felis-image registry.felis.svc:5000/felis:v1). A wrong push URL is caught at build time by the validate gate (§8a, 400). An unreachable registry at runtime (wrong DNS/port, PVC unbound, missing default StorageClass) surfaces as kaniko push or kubelet pull errors — [INTEGRATION-ONLY], not a Felis-emitted string.
Storage: PVC is RWO, 10Gi by default (FELIS_REGISTRY_STORAGE on the first install, --registry-storage for felis manifests), mounted at /var/lib/registry, no storageClassName → binds the cluster default class. If the cluster has no default StorageClass the PVC stays Pending and the registry never starts. On k3s local-path the size is a label: the volume is a directory on the node disk and can outgrow it. What bounds the registry there is the pruner and the garbage collector below. The uploads PVC (FELIS_UPLOADS_STORAGE, 5Gi) and the world-archive PVC (FELIS_BACKUP_STORAGE, 10Gi) work the same way; re-running the installer keeps an existing claim's size and warns when the variable asks for another. One uploaded context is capped by context_max_bytes (1Gi; the panel checks the file against it before uploading). The panel sends a context in parts of at most 32 MiB, staged under .parts/ on the uploads volume, so the Cloudflare edge, which answers its own 413 page for request bodies over 100 MB, never sees a body that large; a dropped connection resumes from the staged length, and a staged upload untouched for 24 hours is deleted. The staged bytes count toward the budgets below. A script can still POST a whole context in one body, which the edge caps at 100 MB. With an s3://user_uploads_context, felis-api sends the finished context on to the bucket in 8 MiB parts, so an upload of any size holds 8 MiB of its memory; S3's 10,000 parts put the ceiling at about 78 GiB. Uploaded build contexts are bounded by user_uploads_max_bytes (4Gi for all users together, §8e), 2 GiB per user, and 10% free space on the volume; past any of them an upload answers 507 uploads_full or 403 submission_quota_exceeded. A rejected submission's upload is deleted 7 days after the verdict; an approved one stays as the source for a rebuild.
Unused images are deleted, in two steps. Every 6 hours felis-api deletes the manifests nothing uses (the log says registry prune finished … deleted=N). It keeps: every whitelist entry (tag, :* wildcard, digest), every server's pinned image, running builds, the control-plane, Kaniko and Trivy images, the Trivy DB copies, anything pushed in the last 24 hours, and the 5 newest tagged builds of each felis/ and mirror/ repository. To keep an older game build, whitelist its versioned tag (§15b). Once a day the registry-gc sidecar then frees the layers no remaining manifest names: it asks the gate for a read-only window after 2 minutes without writes, runs registry garbage-collect, and hands the window back (kubectl -n felis logs deploy/registry -c registry-gc). During the window pulls work and every write answers 503 with Retry-After; the installer and build pushes wait it out. A gate restarted mid-sweep comes back read-only until the lease ends. To sweep now: kubectl -n felis exec deploy/registry -c registry-gc -- rm -f /var/lib/registry/.felis-last-gc and restart the pod.
The registry volume is lost: re-run the installer; it pushes every platform image again. With the off-site copy on (§16), sudo felis offsite fetch-images pushes the user images back at their old digests, so servers pinned to them pull again; it pushes only what the registry lacks, so a second run after an interruption is cheap. Without an off-site copy of the images, user images come back from their approved submissions (whose uploads the off-site copy also carries): the uploaded context of an approved submission stays on the uploads PVC (GET /api/v1/submissions/{id}/context, its context_ref and image_ref are in GET /api/v1/submissions), so an admin can build it again through POST /api/v1/images/build. Servers pinned to a digest the new registry lacks fail to pull until an admin picks a current image for them (§15b).
Node-side pulls: containerd cannot dial the Service VIP (the live stack answered "Empty reply"), so the registry Deployment binds a loopback hostPort (127.0.0.1:<port>) and the installer writes a /etc/rancher/k3s/registries.yaml mirror relaying registry.<ns>.svc:<port> onto it. That pair is what lets kubelet re-pull a garbage-collected image; both halves must survive together (remove either and every pull after an image GC fails).
Memory: the registry's limit is 2Gi, deliberately larger than the other control-plane pods' 256Mi — a live 475MB-layer push OOM-killed the 256Mi template mid-upload (audit #46). Very large layers need headroom here, not more CPU.
Write authorization: registry:2 listens on the pod's loopback only; the registry-gate sidecar (felis registry-gate, the felis image) owns the port and the hostPort. Reads are anonymous — containerd, Kaniko and Trivy pull without a credential — but an anonymous GET /v2/ answers 401 Basic so docker knows to send the credential on a push. Every write needs HTTP basic auth against a token in the felis-registry-auth Secret: platform may write anything (the installer's own images, the mirror/ DB copies); build (a build Job's push container, via felis-registry-push in felis-build) may write anything outside felis/ and mirror/ and may never delete. A missing Secret leaves the registry read-only rather than down. The tokens persist in /etc/felis/secrets.env; sudo felis rotate-token -yes registry replaces all three and restarts the registry (the gate reads its tokens at start) and felis-api, which presents the prune token (§6 "Rotating a token").
Who can connect: felis-registry-ingress admits only the felis-build namespace to the registry pod. Node-local traffic (containerd pulls, the installer's pushes through the hostPort) is always allowed by Kubernetes; game servers cannot reach it at all (felis-server-egress).
GC pinning: the registry pod's own images (registry:2 and the felis image its gate runs) cannot be pulled from the registry they make up, so the installer labels both io.cri-containerd.pinned=pinned in containerd and kubelet's image GC never collects them. Check with k3s ctr images ls | grep pinned.
The registry image is pinned by digest (docker.io/library/registry:2.8.3@sha256:a3d8aaa6…), and the installer caches it with k3s crictl pull. On an air-gapped node, carry it over with containerd's own export, which keeps the digest ref. On a connected machine with k3s or containerd (R is the full docker.io/library/registry@sha256:… ref from internal/platform/identities.go): ctr images pull --all-platforms $R && ctr images export --all-platforms registry.tar $R; on the node: k3s ctr images import --all-platforms registry.tar, then re-run the installer to pin it. A docker save round trip rewrites the manifest, and kubelet will not match it to the digest.
Selector quirk worth knowing: the registry Service selector is only name + component=registry — it deliberately lacks the part-of=felis-control-plane label, so the registry is invisible to the RCON-peer NetworkPolicy selector. This is intended isolation, not a bug; do not "fix" it by adding the label.

Registry manifest rendering is [GO-TESTED]; actual serving is [CODE-ONLY/INTEGRATION-ONLY].

10. World reaper: false-deletes and skipped backups (spec §18)

The reaper is a run-once daily CronJob batch, not an operator controller. Every install with an archive store gets it. Without FELIS_WORLDS_HOST_PATH it runs felis reaper --retention-only: it deletes backups past their expiry, reads archives back and sweeps the store (the second half of "A failed reaper Job" below), never looks at a server, and its summary shows evaluated=0. The installer says so (idle-world retention is off). Setting the worlds root on a re-run turns world reaping on. [GO-TESTED: TestRunRetentionTouchesNoWorld, TestReaperCronJob_Gating, TestReaperCronJob_RetentionOnlyShape.]

With a worlds root the reaper reaps a world only when now - last_active_at > 15d (inactive_15d); the 15-day deadline is hard-fixed in code (only warn_before / retention / max_local_bytes, the on-demand backup keys manual_retention / manual_keep / manual_cooldown and the scheduled backup keys scheduled_every / scheduled_keep / scheduled_retention are configurable from felis.toml [archive]).

What a backup contains

A backup tars the server's ENTIRE data volume — the same volume the server mounts at /data: world folders, server.properties, plugins/mods, configs, jars, libraries, logs and cache, not just the world/ directory. A restore replaces the volume's contents with the archive (files added since the backup are pruned), so a restore also rolls config/plugin changes back. Sizes are dominated by libraries/cache on stock Paper servers (~170MB for a fresh instance before any world growth) — do not size the archive PVC as if only world data were stored.

The backup-before-delete invariant

The reap sequence (all [GO-TESTED] hermetically) preserves the world unless a confirmed, DB-recorded backup exists:

The world must be at rest before it is archived. A server still meant to run is told to stop (desiredState: Stopped) and left for the next run; one still stopping, whose game pod still exists, or whose world a restore, backup or file change holds is left too. Each of these counts in awaiting_stop= and does not fail the run. Once the server is down, the reaper takes the world's maintenance lock (§3b) and holds it through the archive and the volume delete: nothing can start the server or touch its world in between. A lock the reaper can no longer rewrite, or one someone else removed, ends the reap before DeletePVC. [GO-TESTED: TestHoldWorldStopsARunningServer, TestHoldWorldWaitsUntilQuiet, TestReapLostHoldKeepsWorld; live-drilled: a running server was told to stop on the first run and archived and deleted under reap@… on the next.]
ensureCapacity (only if max_local_bytes > 0) frees room by evicting owners' on-demand backups first, oldest first, then reaper archives whose off-site copy is confirmed. The only copy of a reaped world is never evicted: it stays until retention expires it. Still full ⇒ world preserved (not deleted), counted in store_full=. [GO-TESTED: TestCapacityEvictionOrderSparesSoleCopies; PG-TESTED: TestManualBackupRationing]
Archiver.Archive fails ⇒ world preserved, PVC untouched.
InsertBackup (DB) fails ⇒ the orphan archive is deleted, PVC untouched.
With an [offsite] bucket configured (§16), the archive must also be in the bucket: until felis offsite sync has copied it and set offsite_at on its world_backups row, the run logs world archived, kept until the archive's off-site copy is confirmed, counts it in awaiting_offsite= and leaves the PVC alone. The next daily run after the copy reuses the same archive and deletes. [GO-TESTED: TestReapWaitsForOffsiteCopy]
Only then, with the lock still held, DeletePVC → ReleaseWorld → audit → felis_reaper_worlds_deleted_total++, and the lock is dropped.

An archive the run reuses (step 4's second run, or a reap interrupted after its archive) is read back end to end and checked against the sha256 recorded when it was written before the world goes. One that does not match is marked corrupt, never offered for restore, and replaced by a fresh archive; one that cannot be read at all keeps the world until the next run. [GO-TESTED: TestReapReadsBackReusedArchive, TestReapReplacesCorruptArchive, TestReapKeepsWorldWhenReadBackFails.]

So a missing backup never results in a deleted world, and with a bucket configured neither does a backup that exists on this disk only. [GO-TESTED: TestReapArchiveFailurePreservesWorld, TestReapInsertBackupFailurePreservesWorld, TestReapIdleWorldFullSequence.]

awaiting_offsite that stays above zero for more than a day means the copy is failing: sudo felis offsite status (§16).

A failed reaper Job

Each run ends with one line:

felis reaper: evaluated=12 reaped=1 released=0 deleted=0 awaiting_offsite=0 awaiting_stop=0 warned=2 skipped=0 store_full=0 evicted=0 expired=3 expire_failed=0 verified=6 corrupt=0 verify_failed=0 swept=0 orphan_archives=0

released and deleted count retirements carried out: servers their owner gave up (or an admin released) and servers an admin deleted, each world archived first as a released backup. skipped counts servers the run failed on (steps 1–3 above, or the cluster or the database answering with an error; exempt servers and rows whose CRD is gone are not counted, except a deletion whose MinecraftServer is gone while its world volume remains), store_full the subset kept because the backup store is full, and expire_failed expired backups it could not remove. awaiting_stop counts idle servers left for the next run because they were not yet down (step 0); it does not fail the run, but a server that stays there for days is being started again by something, or a Job keeps holding its world.

After the servers, every run looks after the archive store itself:

verified archives were read back and matched their recorded sha256; each run reads back up to ten archives not checked in the past week, oldest check first. corrupt ones did not match (or are gone from the volume) and are marked so: the backup page shows them as damaged and refuses to restore them. verify_failed ones could not be read at all and are retried the next run.
swept counts leftovers of an interrupted archive (*.partial files older than six hours) the run removed. orphan_archives counts finished archives no backup record points to; they are kept until they are older than retention, then removed, and each run lists the first few by path.

skipped, expire_failed, corrupt, verify_failed above zero, or a sweep that could not finish, make the process exit 1: the worlds are safe, but the Job fails so the watchdog mails world reaper Job … failed and FelisWorldJobFailed fires. The Job retries twice (backoffLimit), each retry re-running the whole batch, which is safe because every step is idempotent. Read the error above the summary:

kubectl -n minecraft logs job/<the failed felis-reaper-… Job>

A server that fails every day keeps its world and is retried every day, so the Job fails every day until the cause is fixed; after 26 hours the watchdog also reports the world reaper has not succeeded for …. [GO-TESTED: TestReportReaperRunFailsTheJob, TestExpiryFailureFailsTheRun, TestCapacityStillFullSkipsReap.]

On-demand backups (Back up now)

An owner's "Back up now" writes a manual backup into the same store and onto the same disk as the worlds and the database, so it is rationed:

Key	Default	Effect
`manual_retention`	`30d`	when a manual backup expires (reaper archives use `retention`)
`manual_keep`	`5`	manual backups kept per server; after each backup the Job removes older ones and prints `removed older backup …`
`manual_cooldown`	`10m`	one owner-started backup per server per window; the next one gets `429 backup_cooldown` with `Retry-After` (`0s` disables)

While the present backups add up to max_local_bytes or more, owners get 507 backup_store_full. Admins and the break-glass console are exempt from the cooldown and the cap. Whoever starts it, the backup Job refuses to write an archive that would leave less than 10% of the archive filesystem free: it fails with not enough free disk for the archive. A failed backup or restore shows the error its container exited on under Recent operations on the server's backup page. [GO-TESTED: TestBackupNow, TestCheckRoom, TestReaperConfigManualKeys, TestLatestJobsExplainsFailures]

Deleting one backup

The delete button on a backup row (DELETE /api/v1/backups/{id}) takes that backup out of every list, every restore and the max_local_bytes count at once: its row turns expired, with expires_at pulled back to the moment of the delete. An admin may delete any backup, a user only one of a world they owned (the scope that lists it); any other id is 404 no_backup. While a restore on that server may be reading the archive (a restore Job still running, or a safety snapshot whose restore of this backup has yet to start) the delete is 409 restore_in_progress. The audit action is backup.delete, with the backup id, former owner and size in its payload.

The archive stays on the backup volume until the reaper's next daily run, whose retention pass deletes every expired row's archive whatever its expires_at; the off-site copy goes at the sync after the delete. Until that run an admin can take the delete back, with the id from the audit entry; clearing offsite_at has the next sync copy it off site again in case its copy is already gone:

sudo k3s kubectl -n felis exec deploy/felis-postgres -c postgres -- psql -U postgres felis -c \
  "UPDATE world_backups SET status = 'present', expires_at = now() + interval '30 days', offsite_at = NULL
   WHERE id = '<backup id>' AND status = 'expired'"

[GO-TESTED: TestDeleteBackup, TestExpiredBackupsDeleted, TestSyncExpiresOnlyPastRetention; PG-TESTED: TestOwnerDeletedBackup]

Downloading a backup or the world (export)

The download button on a backup row (POST /api/v1/servers/{name}/backups/{id}/export) and "Export world" in the page header (POST /api/v1/servers/{name}/world/export) hand the owner a .tar.gz. Who may download a backup follows delete and restore: an admin any, a user only one of a world they owned (404 no_backup otherwise), a backup of another server is 403, and a corrupt one 409 backup_corrupt. The world export needs the server stopped (409 not_stopped) and a world volume (409 no_world_volume), and it takes the world like a backup does (§3b), so nothing starts the server until the download ends. The audit actions are backup.export and world.export.

Neither archive is staged anywhere. felis-api starts a felis-export Job in the server namespace (managed-by felis-export, label felis.lolicon.best/export-modeworld or backup), which mounts the world or the backup volume read-only and PUTs the archive to felis-api's internal face with a one-time token; felis-api streams it straight to the browser. The panel polls GET /api/v1/exports/{ticket} until it reads ready, then opens GET /api/v1/exports/{ticket}/download as a plain link. The ticket belongs to the user who asked, opens the download once, and has these clocks:

Limit	Value	When it runs out
Job reaching felis-api	10 min	the ticket answers `410 export_expired`
Browser opening the download once `ready`	90 s	the Job's upload gets `410`, the ticket is spent
Either end sending nothing mid-transfer	2 min	the download is cut off
The Job as a whole	2 h (`activeDeadlineSeconds`)	Kubernetes ends it

At most one export per user runs at a time, two across the platform, and six per user per hour; past any of them the start is 429 export_busy with Retry-After. A deployment without FELIS_IMAGE and FELIS_BACKUP_PVC answers 503 export_unavailable (felis-api logs world export disabled at start).

A backup download carries the archive's length and is checked against the sha256 recorded when it was written. The last chunk is held back until the digest matches, so a mismatch cuts the download off short, the browser shows it failed, and the Job exits with 409 backup_corrupt. A digest mismatch does not mark the backup corrupt; the reaper's next read-back does. A world download has no length and no digest: a read error in the Job cuts it off the same way.

Why an export failed shows under Recent operations as the Job's last line. A Job that fails before it reaches felis-api (an archive missing from the backup volume, say) also ends the panel's wait with that line. The rest happen after the panel has handed the download to the browser:

felis-api answered 410 Gone: this export has expired …: nobody opened the download within 90 s (the tab was closed, or the browser blocked the download).
felis-api answered 410 Gone: the download ended before the archive did …: the browser cancelled or lost the connection mid-way.
felis-api answered 404 Not Found: no such export: felis-api restarted since the export began, or the ticket had already run out. Tickets live only in felis-api's memory, so start the export again.

A world export whose Job never reaches felis-api keeps the world until the Job's deadline; kubectl -n minecraft delete job -l app.kubernetes.io/managed-by=felis-export,felis.lolicon.best/server=<name> releases it at once. [GO-TESTED: TestExportBackupGate, TestExportWorldGate, TestExportLimits, TestExportRendezvous, TestExportExpiry, TestExportStatusReportsFailedJob, TestExportRegistryRaces, TestExportBackupDigest, TestExportUploadPace, TestK8sExportJobs, TestExportJobIsolation, TestExportJobDefaults, TestCmdExportWorld, TestCmdExportBackup, TestCmdExportWiring]

Every world at once: `felis backup-now`

A world lives only in its volume, and the off-site copy holds only its archives. Before anything that could lose a volume (growing the disk, moving the data to its own disk, moving to another host: operations.md §2 and §5), archive every world from the node:

bash

sudo felis backup-now                    # the plan; nothing changes
sudo felis backup-now -yes               # archive every stopped world, one at a time
sudo felis backup-now -yes -stop         # stop the running servers first
sudo felis backup-now -yes alpha bravo   # only these servers

It runs as root because it reads the ops token (felis/felis-ops-token, §6) and asks felis-api's internal face for each backup. Each archive is an ordinary manual backup (the same Job, the same 10% free-disk check, the audit action backup.create with the source internal:ops and the sudo user as actor), exempt from the owner cooldown and the max_local_bytes cap like the break-glass console.

The plan lists every user server with its phase and what the run does with it: back up, stop, then back up, skip: running (stop it first, or pass -stop), or skip: no world volume (never started, nothing to save). With nothing to archive it ends Nothing to back up.
Each archive counts against manual_keep: a server that already holds that many manual backups loses its oldest, and the plan says so. Raise [archive] manual_keep first when those older backups matter.
Stopped servers go first, so a felis-api that cannot take a backup is found before anything is stopped for one. The run waits for each Job (alpha: archived in 42s) before starting the next.
-stop disconnects the players and leaves those servers stopped (Left stopped: …; start them from the panel). Each stop writes break_glass.halt to the audit log. A server still up after 10 minutes counts as failed, and the run moves on.
An unreachable felis-api ends the run (Stopped: nothing more can be backed up until felis-api answers). Ctrl-C ends it after the current step; a backup Job already started runs to its end.
The archives stay on the node until the hourly off-site copy. After a run that archived something the command prints sudo systemctl start felis-offsite.service, which sends them now; sudo felis offsite status shows what still waits.

It exits 0 when every world with a volume was archived, 1 when a backup failed, a running server was skipped (no -stop) or the run was interrupted, and 2 for a name that is no user server. [GO-TESTED: TestBackupNowPlanChangesNothing, TestBackupNowPlanWithNothingToSave, TestBackupNowBacksUpEachWorldInTurn, TestBackupNowSkipsRunningServersWithoutStop, TestBackupNowStopsAtAnUnreachableAPI, TestBackupNowStopsWhenInterrupted, TestBackupNowNamedServers]

Scheduled backups (daily restore points)

A world played every day never idles 15 days, so the reaper never archives it. felis-api therefore takes a scheduled backup of every owned world that somebody joined since its owner's last intact scheduled backup, once that backup is scheduled_every old. This works without a worlds root: it is the same backup Job "Back up now" starts, so it needs only FELIS_IMAGE and FELIS_BACKUP_PVC (felis-api logs scheduled backups off at start when either is missing or scheduled_every is 0s).

Key	Default	Effect
`scheduled_every`	`1d`	how old a world's newest scheduled backup must be before it gets the next one (`0s` turns scheduled backups off)
`scheduled_keep`	`7`	scheduled backups kept per server and owner; the Job removes older ones like `manual_keep`
`scheduled_retention`	`90d`	when a scheduled backup expires

How it behaves:

Only a stopped server is backed up. The Job mounts the world volume, which a running server holds. Idle auto-stop brings a played world down minutes after its last player leaves, so the point normally lands the same day. A server with auto-stop turned off gets its point the next time it stops; one that never stops never gets one.
One Job at a time, cluster-wide. felis-api checks every 2 minutes and starts one scheduled backup only while no backup or restore Job is running, worlds without a point first. It holds the world like any backup, so a player who wakes the server during those minutes sees the maintenance message and can retry once it finishes.
Paused while the store is full. While the present backups add up to max_local_bytes, no scheduled backup starts (felis-api logs scheduled backups paused and resumed once each). The backup Job's 10% free-disk check applies too.
A failed backup is retried after a quarter of scheduled_every (6 hours by default); the failure shows under Recent operations as "Scheduled backup".
Counted per owner. A backup the world's previous owner took before it was reaped and claimed again is no restore point of the new owner's world, and the new owner's backups never prune it. The keep-N prune of every reason is scoped to the backup's owner the same way.
Scheduled backups write the audit action backup.scheduled (actor scheduler) and never start the owner's manual_cooldown. They are copied offsite and evicted by max_local_bytes like manual backups.

[GO-TESTED: TestBackupScheduler, TestK8sScheduledBackupJobs, TestBackupJobRecordsAScheduledBackup, TestBackupPolicyPerReason, TestReaperConfigScheduledKeys; PG-TESTED: TestScheduledBackupCandidates, TestExcessBackupsPerOwner]

Exemptions (world never reaped)

spec.reaperExempt=true → skipped entirely (system servers). [GO-TESTED TestReapExemptServerNeverTouched.]
CRD missing → logs reaper: CRD missing, skipping, skipped.
Idle ≤ 15d → not yet eligible.

Pre-reap warnings (the `warn_before` offsets)

An OWNED server inside a warning window gets an email notice (3d/1d before the deadline, warn_before from [archive]) to the owner's verified email — the same [smtp] relay felis-api uses. The warned_3d_at / warned_1d_at stamps record a delivered notice:

No [smtp] configured (or owner has no verified address): the run logs reaper: warning suppressed — no warner wired / a delivery error and does NOT stamp. Nothing is falsely recorded as sent, and the day SMTP is configured the pending warning can still go out.
Delivery failure (relay down): logged and retried on the next daily run — bounded by the warning window, since the reap removes the candidate anyway.
warned= in the run output counts DELIVERED notices, not attempts.

The reaper runs in the minecraft namespace and reads the mirrors of felis-smtp and felis-config there (a secretKeyRef is namespace-local). The installed felis setup's "configure email" screen refreshes both mirrors when it applies, so configuring SMTP after install is enough; a manual edit of the control-namespace Secret alone is not. [GO-TESTED: the delivered/retried/ suppressed matrix in internal/reaper; live-drilled end to end against a local SMTP sink.]

The screen also keeps the password in /etc/felis/smtp-password (mode 0600), and the uploads screen keeps the bucket keys in /etc/felis/uploads-s3-access-key and uploads-s3-secret-key. Secrets live in k3s's datastore, which a reinstall or a host rebuilt from a bundle's state/ starts empty, so every installer run applies felis-smtp (both namespaces) and felis-uploads-s3 from these files. The files win: a hand edit of either Secret lasts until the next installer run, so change a credential through felis setup. An install from before these files gets them from the Secrets on its first re-run. When [smtp] has a username but no password is on either side, or uploads go to s3:// without both keys, the installer says so and names the felis setup screen that takes them again. [SH-TESTED: deploy/bootstrap_test.sh, the move from the Secrets, the host copy winning, both warnings, no value in kubectl's argv. GO-TESTED: the host copy's mode and replacement.]

Genuine false-delete risk vectors

Stale last_active_at. The keep-alive is RecordJoin, called from the internal join-event handler. If join events are not delivered to the API, the activity clock never resets and an actively-played world becomes reap-eligible after 15 days. Verify join events are flowing (§3a) — this is the most important reaper check. [INTEGRATION-ONLY for the live Postgres write.] A claim also resets it: ClaimServer sets last_active_at to the claim and clears warned_*, so a world reaped long ago and claimed again gets a full 15 days, and a later reap archives the new owner's world rather than reusing the previous owner's archive (FreshBackup counts only inactive_15d archives taken since the claim). [PG-TESTED TestReclaimRestartsReaperClock.]
Unowned servers are still reaped. A server with owner_id="" gets no pre-deletion warning (maybeWarn skips unowned), but is still reaped at 15d. [GO-TESTED TestReapUnownedServerStillReaped.] Claim or exempt servers you want to keep.
DeletePVC is idempotent (missing PVC is not an error), so a re-run will not fail on already-reaped worlds.
An idle server whose world volume is already gone. With a fresh reaper archive taken since the last activity, the run takes it as a reap that was interrupted after the delete and finishes it (release, audit, count). An unowned server with no such archive only has its idle clock restarted, so it is neither counted nor audited again every day. An owned one is released and audited once, since there is no world to archive. [GO-TESTED: TestReapFinishesInterruptedReap, TestReapUnownedWithoutWorldRestartsClock, TestReapOwnedWithoutWorldReleases.]

Only TarLocal (tar+gzip) archiving is implemented; VolumeSnapshot/Longhorn backends return not implemented in this build. The live PVC delete / Postgres store paths are [INTEGRATION-ONLY].

Where worlds are read from (hostPath resolution)

The CronJob mounts --worlds-host-path read-only at /worlds through a static PersistentVolume (felis-worlds-root-<digest>, hostPath type Directory, Retain, pre-bound to the same-named PVC in the minecraft namespace), since the namespace's PodSecurity baseline refuses an inline hostPath in any pod. A re-install with a different worlds root or --reaper-node renders a new pair under a new digest; the old PV/PVC pair is left behind unused and can be deleted by hand (Retain: deleting it never touches the directory). The resolver runs cmd/felis/reaper.resolveWorldDir: it looks for <root>/<pvc>, then for the stock local-path directory <root>/<pv-name>_<ns>_<pvc-name> derived from the live PVC's spec.volumeName (never a glob — a leftover directory of a deleted PV must not stand in for the world the PVC currently binds). Pointing the flag at k3s's storage root (/var/lib/rancher/k3s/storage) is therefore the supported way to enable retention on a stock install. Two deployment facts the resolver cannot fix:

Permissions. The reaper Pod runs as root and carries DAC_OVERRIDE: k3s's storage root is 0700 root:root, worlds are written by the game uid (1000) — or by root, for a world an older release wrote — and Paper saves level.dat mode-0600, so a fixed non-root identity (the previous uid-1000 convention, and the ACL setup that went with it) could neither walk the tree nor read the files — every archive failed open …/level.dat: permission denied. The installer no longer grants uid 1000 any access to the storage root: that uid is now the game servers'. If a world is still preserved while a reap was expected, it is a different cause: check the run's ERROR logs for the resolver's lstat messages before suspecting permissions.
Node placement. Multi-node clusters: the world's directory exists only on the node holding its volume, so pass --reaper-node; it pins both the CronJob's pod and the PV (single-node starters are pinned implicitly).

11. Idle auto-stop never fires; player count always shows 0

Every server created from the panel or felis apply stops itself after 600 s with nobody online (spec.idle), and the next join wakes it. An admin changes or turns it off under Edit server → Idle auto-stop. A server created before this default has no spec.idle and never stops; sudo felis converge gives it the default (§12b). The login gate and the lobby never idle out, whatever their spec says.

kubectl get minecraftserver <name> -o jsonpath='{.spec.idle}'

Both idle stop and the player count also hang off spec.rcon.enabled. Check it next.

kubectl get minecraftserver <name> -o jsonpath='{.spec.rcon.enabled}'

The player tally is a by-product of the RCON readiness probe: prober.go runs list on the same connection that just authenticated, and parseListReply reads the tally from the vanilla/Paper/Fabric/Forge reply (There are 3 of a max of 20 players online), the 1.12/Bukkit reply (There are 3/20 players online) or the EssentialsX reply (There are 3 out of maximum 20 players online, vanished players included), with § color codes stripped. With RCON disabled the probe never runs and no tally is ever read, so a permanent 0 means "never sampled", not "nobody online".

A tally that could not be read counts as unknown, never as zero. Idle auto-stop only acts on a count it actually read:

if players.Known && server.Spec.Idle.AutoStopEnabled && server.Spec.Idle.EmptySecondsBeforeStop > 0 {

An unknown tally leaves status.players at the last real count, neither starts nor clears the empty countdown, and sets the PlayersCounted condition to False with reason ListUnreadable. So enabling spec.idle.* without RCON is a no-op by design, and a server whose list reply is in a format Felis does not know (a plugin that rewrites /list, a translated reply) never idles out:

kubectl get minecraftserver <name> -o jsonpath='{.status.conditions[?(@.type=="PlayersCounted")]}'
# Reason ListUnreadable: run `list` in the server's panel console to see
# what the server actually answers.

Fix it by restoring a supported /list (for example, drop the plugin's override or its translation of that one message). The server keeps running either way; only the idle stop waits.

Both fields set and still nothing happens? Then the probe is failing rather than disabled: the server would be stuck in Starting with RconNotReachable (reconciler.go:156), which is §1's symptom, not this one.

This path used to fail even with everything configured correctly, through three stacked defects proven and fixed on a live cluster (auditfix21/22): the emptySince stamp was pruned by a missing CRD status field, a quiescent empty server produced no watch events to re-check the timer, and the Role lacked the minecraftservers:patch grant the stop write needs. If auto-stop ever looks dead again, check these three in order (each is now pinned by a test):

# ① The stamp must persist — should print a timestamp, not an empty string,
#    a few seconds after a server goes Ready with zero players.
kubectl get minecraftserver <name> -o jsonpath='{.status.emptySince}'

# ② The operator must be able to write spec.desiredState (403 in the operator
#    log = missing patch grant on Role felis-operator).
kubectl auth can-i patch minecraftservers -n <ns> --as=system:serviceaccount:<ctl-ns>:felis-operator

# ③ A wake-up must be scheduled: while empty, expect whatever you set
#    as emptySecondsBeforeStop to elapse and the box to flip to Stopped without
#    any external action.

While players are online the operator re-probes on a 30s cadence so it notices the moment the last one leaves; while empty it schedules a wake-up exactly at the deadline. Quiet operator logs on an idle server are normal — the action is the scheduled wake-up, not a stream of reconciles.

Note the reaper's last_active_at (§10) is a different subsystem (Postgres business layer, bumped by join events) — it keeps worlds alive against the reaper, but it does not auto-stop empty running servers.

12. A configuration field seems to be ignored

Every field below is read by a controller. What varies is the condition that decides whether setting it does anything.

Field	What you might expect	Reality
`spec.startup.timeoutSeconds`	Start budget before `Failed`	Read by `startupTimedOut` (`reconciler.go:479`), called at `:126`. `0` or unset falls back to 300s, then `markFailed("StartupTimeout")`
`spec.startup.readinessTimeoutSeconds`	First-probe budget	Read by `readinessTimedOut` (`reconciler.go:490`), called at `:157`. `0` or unset falls back to 300s, then `markFailed("ReadinessTimeout")`. Not to be confused with the prober's own 5s dial timeout (`prober.go:45`)
`spec.idle.autoStopEnabled`	Auto-stop empty servers	Read at `reconciler.go:175` — but gated on `spec.rcon.enabled`, since the player tally comes from the RCON probe (§11)
`spec.idle.emptySecondsBeforeStop`	Empty grace period	Same branch. Must be `> 0`; the guard treats `0` as "off", not "stop immediately"

Both startup budgets are measured from the same status.startRequestedAt, so readinessTimeoutSeconds is not a budget after pod readiness — it is a deadline for the whole start, applied on the RCON-probe branch.

12b. A newer field never reaches an already-installed system server (`felis converge`)

Provisioning is create-if-absent: felis setup never rewrites an existing login/lobby MinecraftServer beyond the config-derived env it owns, so a field the desired spec gained after your install sits absent forever — this is how a deployment ends up with a lobby that has no spec.rcon (a dead console and an online-player count that is always 0) and a login gate without spec.startup.healthHTTPPort. felis converge is the explicit pass that fills exactly those zero-valued fields (and re-adds a derived env key that is missing). It never overwrites a value that already holds one — an operator's RCON secretRef or tuning survives.

sudo felis converge

Run it after the images are in place. Enabling RCON, or the HTTP readiness gate, on a server whose image predates the listener would hold that server in Starting until the operator marks it Failed — that ordering is the reason this is a command you run rather than something setup does on every re-run. System servers that are already current report already converged.

The same pass gives every user server whose spec.idle was never set (one created before idle stop became the default) the default: stop after 600 s empty. A server whose idle stop an admin turned off keeps a duration on its spec (autoStopEnabled: false, emptySecondsBeforeStop set), so converge leaves it off; only servers it actually filled get a line.

A user server created before every new server got RCON (spec.rcon wholly unset) has a dead console, always shows 0 online, and never idles out, since all three ride RCON. Plain felis converge lists each such server and changes nothing; -user-rcon turns RCON on for them with the block a server created today gets (the <name>-rcon Secret the operator provisions):

sudo felis converge -user-rcon
kubectl -n minecraft get minecraftserver -o custom-columns=NAME:.metadata.name,RCON:.spec.rcon.enabled

It is opt-in for the reason above: the new start waits on the RCON probe, and a server whose image does not open the listener that RCON_PASSWORD asks for stays in Starting until it is marked Failed. Felis's own paper and lobby images open it; check a server running an image a user brought before filling it. A server whose RCON someone set, on or off, is never touched. The change applies at the server's next start.

13. World PVC survives after I deleted the MinecraftServer

This is expected. The world PVC is a StatefulSet VolumeClaimTemplate, and the operator sets the StatefulSet's persistentVolumeClaimRetentionPolicy to Retain on delete and on scale, explicitly rather than by the API default. There is no finalizer. Deleting the MinecraftServer garbage-collects the StatefulSet and keeps the claim, so a MinecraftServer that comes back under the same name mounts the same world. The only code that deletes a world PVC is the reaper, and only after a verified backup (§10).

A kept claim holds the name: creating a new server with it answers 409 world_volume_exists, since the new server would otherwise mount the old world and hand it to its new owner. List the world claims whose server is gone:

comm -23 \
  <(kubectl -n minecraft get pvc -l felis.lolicon.best/server -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.labels.felis\.lolicon\.best/server}{"\n"}{end}' | sort) \
  <(kubectl -n minecraft get minecraftservers -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.name}{"\n"}{end}' | sort)

To reclaim one (take a backup first if the world may still matter):

kubectl -n minecraft delete pvc world-<name>-0      # irreversible — the world is gone

spec.storage.retainOnDelete sat in the CRD and reached no controller. Spec v4.1 §5 asks for it — “Deletion: the finalizer cleans up Service/STS/ConfigMap; PVC follows retainOnDelete” — and neither half was ever built: there is no finalizer, and nothing read the field. It was removed rather than implemented, which is a deliberate departure from that line, recorded here because the spec is a frozen document and still says otherwise.

The reasoning is that implementing it buys a second path that deletes a world — one that skips the reaper's verified-backup check — in order to restore a finalizer whose other listed duties (Service, StatefulSet, ConfigMap) ownerReference GC already performs. A CR still carrying the field keeps working: the API server prunes the unknown key on its next write, and nothing above changes, because retention was never conditional in the first place.

13b. Node runs out of disk: what survives, and how to recover

A full disk is the most destructive failure this stack sees: kubelet evicts game pods (the control plane is protected below), and its image GC then collects images nothing is running. The images have a pull source now — the in-cluster registry — so they come back without an operator re-import; freeing space is what completes the recovery.

Eviction. Every control-plane pod (api, operator, reaper, registry) runs under the BUILT-IN system-cluster-critical PriorityClass (value 2e9). Kubelet's node-pressure eviction refuses to touch those pods — the log shows "Eviction manager: cannot evict a critical pod" for each of them — while game-server pods at the default priority 0 are evicted first. A drill that filled the disk to 1.7G free saw exactly this: login/lobby evicted, the whole control plane still Running (before the fix the same drill evicted the api, operator and registry too, and the image-GC stage below followed). User-defined PriorityClasses cannot substitute: the API caps them at 1e9, below kubelet's critical threshold. The built-in class allows preemption (its policy is fixed), so a control-plane pod that cannot fit may preempt a game pod — deliberate: the management plane must be placeable.

The pressure condition clears slowly. After you free space, the node can stay DiskPressure:True for up to ~5 minutes (--eviction-pressure-transition-period defaults to 5m, to stop the condition flapping); pods that need scheduling wait for it. This is the bulk of the "recovery takes minutes" observation, not a stuck node.

The images may be gone — they come back on their own. If pods were evicted, the kubelet can garbage-collect their images (unused > 2 minutes under imagefs pressure). Every image this platform runs is ALSO hosted in the in-cluster registry: the installer builds each one as registry.<ns>.svc:5000/felis/… and mirrors it there, and the node's containerd is configured (a registries.yaml mirror onto the registry's loopback hostPort) to relay those refs back through it. So a GC'd image is re-pulled on the next attempt with no operator action — delete the stuck pod to force an immediate retry (or wait out the backoff), and the workload converges.

If a pull does NOT come back:

Free disk on the node (df -h /var/lib/rancher; the biggest consumers are k3s ctr images ls -q and the world/backup PVCs under /var/lib/rancher/k3s/storage).
Check the registry: kubectl -n felis get pods -l app.kubernetes.io/component=registry and, on the node, curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' http://127.0.0.1:5000/healthz (expect 200: the registry gate answers it only while registry:2 behind it does). An anonymous GET /v2/ answers 401 by design — see §9.
Check the mirror file: /etc/rancher/k3s/registries.yaml must map registry.felis.svc:5000 to http://127.0.0.1:5000. Missing or changed: re-run the installer (it rewrites the file and restarts k3s only when the content changed).
Re-mirror a tag the registry does not have (hand-built images were never pushed): sudo systemctl start docker (the installer leaves the daemon stopped), log in as platform (password: kubectl -n felis get secret felis-registry-auth -o jsonpath='{.data.platform}' | base64 -d), then docker tag <ref> 127.0.0.1:5000/<repo>:<tag> && docker push 127.0.0.1:5000/<repo>:<tag>.

For an image that is in neither place, the old fallback still stands: re-run the installer (it rebuilds/re-imports from the local Docker store AND mirrors into the registry), or for a single image docker save felis:<tag> | k3s ctr images import -. The Docker store remains a deliberate second copy on the node; treat it as the recovery path, not as free space.

13c. The host's address, name or clock changed

An install is bound to the address it was made on. bootstrap.sh gives that address to the k3s node and writes it into the network policies, the panel certificate and the default <ip>.nip.io root domain, and nothing re-addresses a live install. When the host loses the address (a DHCP lease that came back different, a moved VM), the cluster and the proxy's path to the game servers still name the old one, and the panel stops answering on its old name. The watchdog reports it as host-address (critical, after 5 minutes). The installer warns at install time when the address is a DHCP lease.

Remedy: give the host its old address back, either as a DHCP reservation on the router or as a static address (nmcli con mod <con> ipv4.method manual ipv4.addresses <ip>/<prefix> ipv4.gateway <gw> ipv4.dns <dns> && nmcli con up <con> on Rocky), then restart felis-api (sudo k3s kubectl -n felis rollout restart deploy/felis-api) and the proxy (sudo systemctl restart felis-velocity). Moving an install to a new address is a reinstall onto a restored backup (docs/operations.md §5). A default <ip>.nip.io root domain names the old address too; once the install runs on its new address, sudo felis domain set <new-ip>.nip.io moves it (docs/operations.md §6).

The node name is pinned. Every local-path volume (worlds, registry, uploads, backups) is bound to its node by name, and k3s takes the name from the hostname unless told otherwise, so renaming the host used to bring k3s back as a second, empty node with every volume Pending on the old one. The installer pins the name in /etc/rancher/k3s/config.yaml.d/50-felis.yaml (node-name:); a hostname change is then harmless. Check the pin with sudo k3s kubectl get node -o jsonpath='{.items[0].metadata.annotations.k3s\.io/node-args}'. That file also sets write-kubeconfig-mode: "0600": the admin kubeconfig /etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml is cluster-admin and readable by root only, so use sudo k3s kubectl (or sudo -E kubectl).

The clock must be kept by NTP. Sign-in codes and sessions expire by it, S3 refuses off-site uploads signed more than 15 minutes off, and certificate checks fail on a clock far off. The installer turns NTP on (timedatectl set-ntp true, installing chrony where there is no client to enable) unless FELIS_MANAGE_TIME_SYNC=0. The watchdog reports an unsynchronized clock as clock (warning, after 30 minutes). Check with timedatectl (want System clock synchronized: yes and NTP service: active) and chronyc sources; a firewall that drops outbound UDP 123 keeps it unsynchronized.

The system journal is persistent (/etc/systemd/journald.conf.d/50-felis.conf, capped by FELIS_JOURNAL_MAX_USE, default 1G), so journalctl -b -1 shows the boot before a reboot.

13d. k3s certificates expire after a year

k3s issues its own client and serving certificates (the API server's, the kubelet's, the admin kubeconfig's, etcd's) for 365 days and its CA certificates for ten years. It renews the client and serving certificates only as it starts: each start reissues, from the same keys, every one that has expired or is within 120 days of expiring. A host that reboots or takes a k3s upgrade (FELIS_UPGRADE_DEPS=1, docs/operations.md §4) inside that window renews them unnoticed. A host that runs a year without restarting k3s loses its API server and its node the day they lapse, and the panel can no longer start, stop or back up servers. No restart renews a CA certificate; that takes k3s certificate rotate-ca and the procedure in the k3s documentation (Certificate Management).

The watchdog reads the *.crt files under /var/lib/rancher/k3s/server/tls (and its etcd, kube-controller-manager and kube-scheduler directories) and /var/lib/rancher/k3s/agent, the set k3s certificate check reads, and never the keys beside them. It reports the certificate that expires first as k3s-certs: a warning 30 days before, critical in the last 7 days and once it has lapsed, and the hint says whether a restart renews it (a CA it does not). felis watchdog -k3s-cert-dirs "" turns the check off. [GO-TESTED: TestCertFinding] [VM-VERIFIED: against the real certificates of a v1.36.4+k3s1 install, with the clock moved ahead]

Check and renew:

sudo k3s certificate check --output table   # every certificate, its expiry and residual time
sudo systemctl restart k3s                  # reissues the ones within 120 days of expiry
sudo k3s certificate check --output table   # the renewed ones show about a year again

A restart stops k3s alone. The unit's KillMode=process leaves the containers running, so game servers, PostgreSQL and the control plane keep serving while the API server comes back within a minute. [VM-VERIFIED: every container ID and restart count unchanged across systemctl restart k3s] k3s-killall.sh stops every container along with k3s; keep it out of this.

To renew ahead of the 120-day window (to line it up with a maintenance slot), reissue every client and serving certificate at once:

sudo systemctl stop k3s && sudo k3s certificate rotate && sudo systemctl start k3s

The panel's own certificate (/etc/felis/panel-tls.crt, which the installer self-signs for 825 days) is a different certificate, outside this check.

14. Health alerts, and metrics for diagnosis (spec §23)

Every full install runs felis watchdog from felis-watchdog.timer, which mails the owners when something breaks, with no monitoring stack needed. The metrics and Prometheus rules below are for a deployment that also runs its own Prometheus.

The watchdog: what mails the owners

Every two minutes the host checks:

Check	Mailed after	Severity
`felis-api`, `felis-operator` or `registry` Deployment has no available pod (or is missing)	5 min	critical
Kubernetes API unreachable (k3s down): the cluster checks below are then unknown and keep their state	5 min	critical
Login gate not `Running` while it should be	10 min	critical
Other system servers (lobby) not `Running` while they should be	10 min	warning
A user server in `Failed` (§2)	5 min	warning
A backup, restore or reaper Job failed in the last 24h	at once, once	warning
The reaper CronJob last succeeded over 26h ago (§10)	at once	warning
Node `NotReady`, or kubelet reports Disk/Memory/PID pressure (§13b)	2–5 min	critical
PostgreSQL unreachable	3 min	critical
The game proxy (`felis-velocity`) refuses connections on the game port	3 min	critical
Newest daily control-plane database backup over 26h old, or none (§16); a newer manual or off-site bundle leaves it standing	10 min	critical
A watched filesystem below 15% free (below 5%: critical)	15 min (5 min)	warning
Host memory available below 10%	15 min	warning
The host no longer holds the address the install was made on (§13c)	5 min	critical
The system clock is not synchronized by NTP (§13c)	30 min	warning
A k3s certificate expires within 30 days (within 7 days, or lapsed: critical) (§13d)	at once	warning
The watchdog's own runs keep failing (`watchdog/run`, below)	10 min	critical
The watchdog's state file did not parse and was moved aside (`watchdog/state`, below)	at once, once	warning

How it mails:

Recipients are the verified email addresses of enabled owner accounts. The relay is the [smtp] one sign-in codes use.
One mail per run, holding everything that came due: new problems, a daily reminder for each problem still open, and a resolved notice once a problem has stayed gone for 10 minutes. A condition that heals before its delay is never mailed; one that turns critical is mailed again at once.
During an install nothing is mailed. bootstrap.sh writes /run/felis/watchdog-quiet-until and removes it when it exits.
On a host built from another host's backup (a rehearsal on a spare machine, a rebuild before felis offsite take-over) nothing is mailed while the host the off-site bucket names ran in the last 3 hours: the owners in the restored database are that host's, and it mails them itself. The run logs this host stands by for host ...; holding this mail. Once that host stops running, the standby is mailed like any other finding (§16). [GO-TESTED: TestMailHold]
Caching: the relay password comes from /etc/felis/smtp-password, which the watchdog reads even while the API server is down (an install without that file reads the felis-smtp Secret instead). It and the recipient list are cached in /var/lib/felis/watchdog/state.json (root-only). An outage of PostgreSQL or of the API server can therefore still be mailed. [GO-TESTED: a run with the API server and PostgreSQL both down caches the host copy.]
No relay or no verified owner address: each alert is written to the journal only, and a run with a heartbeat pings its failure endpoint while an alert is open (below). Setup runs without mail, so a fresh install is in this state. The install ends with NO ALERT MAIL, and the card at the end of sudo felis setup has an alerts row that says where alerts go: mailed to <address> via <relay>, or what is missing, marked ⚠. Press e there to configure email, then verify the Owner's address in the panel (Account → Email Verification). The heartbeat row below it shows the check that is pinged. [SH-TESTED; GO-TESTED: TestAlertRouteLines, TestHostAlertRoute]

Commands:

bash

journalctl -u felis-watchdog -n 40          # every check of the latest runs
sudo felis watchdog -dry-run                # run the checks now; mail nothing, change nothing
systemctl list-timers felis-watchdog.timer  # when it last and next runs

A healthy run logs every check passed. Otherwise it logs one line per finding, and the mail's subject once one is sent.

A -dry-run from a shell uses the command's defaults, and those do not include the game-proxy or the address check. The unit carries -proxy-addr 127.0.0.1:<game port>, -node-ip <install address> and the disk list the install chose. systemctl cat felis-watchdog shows them.

The heartbeat: what notices the host itself going down

A host that is off, a timer that stopped, a watchdog that fails before it can mail: the host reports none of these about itself. A heartbeat covers them. Every run pings a check at an outside monitoring service (Healthchecks.io, or one that copies its API), and that service mails you when the pings stop.

Create a check there with a period of 2 minutes and a grace of 10 minutes.
Re-run the installer with FELIS_WATCHDOG_HEARTBEAT_URL=<the check's ping URL>. It writes the URL to /etc/felis/watchdog-heartbeat-url (root-only, 0600). The URL's path is the check's key, so the install and the journal show only its scheme and host.

A later install without the variable keeps the file, and FELIS_WATCHDOG_HEARTBEAT_URL=off removes it. An install with no heartbeat ends with a NO HEARTBEAT warning. [SH-TESTED: deploy/bootstrap_test.sh]

What a run pings:

The run	Ping
Its alerts reach the owners (mailed, or nothing due)	`GET <url>`
An alert is open and reaches no one (no relay, no verified owner address), the mail fails, or the state does not save	`POST <url>/fail`, with the reason and the findings in the body
One of those failures while the installer runs	nothing
A host standing by for another host's off-site bucket (§16)	nothing: the host that writes the bucket pings the check

A URL with a query (?) has no /fail endpoint, so a failing run sends no ping and the check trips once its grace runs out. A ping that times out (10 s) or gets a non-2xx answer logs felis watchdog: heartbeat: ...; the run's exit status stays that of its checks and its mail. [GO-TESTED: TestHeartbeatSend, TestWatchdogRunHeartbeat]

A bundle (§16) carries /etc/felis and the heartbeat file with it. A host rebuilt from one stands by and pings nothing until felis offsite take-over; from then on it pings the same check.

When the watchdog itself fails

felis-watchdog.service carries OnFailure=felis-watchdog-failed.service. A failed run (a crash, the 3 min time limit, a felis.toml that no longer loads) starts felis watchdog -unit-failed, which:

pings the heartbeat's /fail at once with systemd's result, e.g. felis-watchdog.service failed: result exit-code, exit status 3, except while the installer runs or the host stands by;
records watchdog/run and mails it once runs have kept failing for 10 minutes. The relay and recipients come from felis.toml when it loads and from the watchdog's cache when it does not. The first passing run resolves it like any other finding.

[VM-TESTED: on systemd 252, a failing unit with this OnFailure= passed result exit-code, exit status 3 to the fallback, which posted it to a local /fail endpoint; with the installer's quiet file present it withheld the ping. GO-TESTED: TestWatchdogUnitFailedBrokenConfig, six failures two minutes apart mail once, at 10 minutes, through the cached relay.]

A state file (/var/lib/felis/watchdog/state.json) that does not parse is renamed to state.json.unreadable-<unix time>. The run starts from a fresh state and mails watchdog/state once. The fresh state has lost the open alerts' history, so each problem still present is mailed again as new. A power loss right after a save or a hand edit usually causes this; check df -h /var/lib/felis, then delete the set-aside copy. [GO-TESTED: TestRecoverState]

A state file that cannot be written (a full or read-only /var/lib/felis) leaves the run's state in /run/felis/watchdog-state.json (tmpfs, root-only). The next run reads whichever of the two was written last, so an alert that was mailed is not mailed again every two minutes. Each such run logs save state: ...; kept in /run/felis/watchdog-state.json until the host restarts, exits 1 and pings the heartbeat's /fail; after five in a row watchdog/run is mailed once. The first run whose state file saves again deletes the tmpfs copy. A restart before that forgets what was mailed, so the open problems are mailed again as new. [GO-TESTED: TestSaveStateOr, TestWatchdogRunStateThatDoesNotSave, TestWatchdogUnitFailedStateThatDoesNotSave]

bash

journalctl -u felis-watchdog-failed -n 20   # what the fallback reported and pinged
systemctl status felis-watchdog             # the failed run's result

Metrics

All four mandated metrics have real producers; scrape them when triaging:

felis_servers_total — managed server count.
felis_server_phase{server,role,phase,desired} — 1 for each server's current phase. role is login/lobby for system servers and empty for user servers. desired tells a server that is down on purpose from one that failed to come up.
felis_build_info{component,version} — 1 on the process serving it (operator or api). Its absence is how an alert tells which process is down.
felis_start_duration_seconds — histogram, observed once per start when readiness is first reached (ReadySignalAt − StartRequestedAt). A start that never completes (§1) contributes nothing here — absence of observations is itself the signal that starts are hanging.
felis_image_build_failures_total — increments on build Job failure (§8d).
felis_reaper_worlds_deleted_total — increments only after a world PVC is actually deleted post-backup (§10); a spike here means worlds crossed the 15d idle line — cross-check that join events are flowing (§10 risk vectors).
felis_http_requests_total{face,method,route,code} and felis_http_request_duration_seconds{face,route} — every API request, by the route pattern it matched (/api/v1/servers/{name}/status, never the raw path; unmatched for a path no route serves). face is internal or external. Log streams count as requests but stay out of the latency histogram. A rise in code=~"5.." on one route narrows a failure to one handler; route="unmatched" rising is someone scanning.
The Go runtime and process series (go_*, process_*) of felis-api: goroutines, heap, open file descriptors. Goroutines that climb without falling back usually mean streams or uploads that never end.
go_sql_*{db_name="felis"} — the API's database pool. It is capped at 25 connections, and every connection runs with statement_timeout=15s and idle_in_transaction_session_timeout=60s (a [database] url that sets either keeps its own). go_sql_in_use_connections sitting at go_sql_max_open_connections with go_sql_wait_count_total climbing means requests are queueing for a connection: look for a slow query or a lock (SELECT pid, state, wait_event, query FROM pg_stat_activity). A statement cut off by the limit logs canceling statement due to statement timeout.

The API also writes one access-log line per request to its log, in logfmt: face, method, route, path, status, duration_ms, bytes, request_id (the id in every error envelope) and principal (the user id, once signed in). Successful probes and scrapes are left out.

bash

kubectl -n felis logs deploy/felis-api | grep 'msg=request' | grep 'status=5'
kubectl -n felis logs deploy/felis-api | grep 'request_id=<id from the error>'

The plugins' calls are the face="internal" series, one route per call: a failing join-event, wake or link-status poll shows up as its own route.

promql

sum by (route, code) (rate(felis_http_requests_total{face="internal", route="/api/v1/internal/servers/{name}/join-event"}[5m]))
sum by (route, code) (rate(felis_http_requests_total{face="internal", route="/api/v1/internal/servers/{name}/wake"}[5m]))
histogram_quantile(0.95, sum by (le, route) (rate(felis_http_request_duration_seconds_bucket{face="internal"}[5m])))

A call that never reached felis-api (refused, reset, timed out) is missing from those series; the caller counts it. The proxy logs one line per active 10 minutes with felis-api as it saw it plus its own failures, and /felis at the proxy console prints the totals since start:

bash

journalctl -u felis-velocity | grep 'Felis: last 10 min'
# Felis: last 10 min: felis-api calls=412 (no answer=0, 4xx=3, 5xx=0, retried=0), avg=18 ms, max=240 ms,
#   busy refusals=0, join-events failed=0, join-events dropped=0, transfers failed=0,
#   server-list refreshes failed=0, waiting now=0
journalctl -u felis-velocity | grep 'server list refresh'
kubectl -n minecraft logs login-0 | grep 'link status poll'

no answer rising with a flat felis_http_requests_total means the path to the internal face is broken (NetworkPolicy, Service, the api Pod down); busy refusals or join-events dropped above zero means felis-api is slower than the proxy's pool of 8 threads can absorb. A refresh or link-status outage warns when it starts, every 5 minutes while it lasts with the failure count, and at info when it recovers.

Scraping

The series come from two processes. Both Services carry the prometheus.io/scrape|port|path annotations, so a Prometheus that discovers annotated Service endpoints picks them up as is.

felis-operator :8080/metrics (Service felis-operator-metrics) — felis_servers_total, felis_server_phase, felis_start_duration_seconds, felis_build_info{component="operator"}, and controller-runtime's controller_runtime_reconcile_* / workqueue_* series.
felis-api internal face :8081/metrics (Service felis-api-internal) — felis_build_info{component="api"}, the felis_http_* request series, the go_*/process_* runtime series, the go_sql_* pool series, felis_image_build_failures_total, and the sign-in series of §17 (felis_mail_total, felis_rate_limited_total, felis_auth_otp_lockouts_total, felis_auth_failures_total, felis_sessions_revoked_total, felis_audit_write_failures_total). Unauthenticated like the probes; ClusterIP-only, and the external face never serves it.
felis_reaper_worlds_deleted_total is produced inside the one-shot reaper CronJob, which exits long before any scrape interval — without a pushgateway it has no scrape path. Read the reaper Pod log or the world_backups table for deletions instead.

Alert rules

deploy/alerts/ ships ready-made rules for these groups:

Control plane: felis-operator or felis-api down or unscraped (FelisOperatorDown, FelisAPIDown).
Servers: the login gate or another system server not running (FelisLoginGateDown, FelisSystemServerDown), and a user server in Failed (FelisServerFailed).
Operator reconcile: errors piling up (FelisReconcileErrors), and a pass stuck past its 3-minute bound (FelisReconcileStuck). The operator's liveness probe restarts a pod whose pass passes 10 minutes; its readiness waits for the informer caches to sync.
World Jobs (kube-state-metrics): a failed backup/restore/reaper Job (FelisWorldJobFailed) and a reaper that has not succeeded in 26h (FelisReaperStale).
Builds and starts: build failures and slow starts.
Node: disk and memory thresholds, and the kubelet DiskPressure condition.
Database backups: control-plane backup freshness (§16; needs node-exporter's textfile collector).
Sign-in abuse (§17): the mail budget, relay failures, throttled floods, account code locks and the refused sign-in rate, plus lost audit rows.
Plain Prometheus: add felis-alerts.yaml to rule_files. Check and unit-test it standalone with promtool check rules felis-alerts.yaml and promtool test rules felis-alerts_test.yml (the tests pin exactly when each alert fires).
kube-prometheus-stack / prometheus-operator: kubectl apply -f felis-prometheusrule.yaml (adjust its release: label to your stack's ruleSelector).

15. Control-plane upgrades, and rolling back a bad one

There is no in-place updater: an upgrade is re-running the installer (curl -fsSL <installer URL> | sudo bash), which imports the release's images (or rebuilds them on the host, operations §1 "Where the binary and the images come from") and re-applies the bundle. felis update --panel prints that command with the script read at the newest release's tag, so the installer and the binary it downloads come from the same release. (sudo felis setup is not this path; on a completed install it only opens the config console.) The channel is not persisted across the re-run, so pass FELIS_VERSION_BOOTSTRAP=dev on a host that tracks main. Two properties of the control plane matter when you do:

Both Deployments use strategy Recreate (single replica, no leader election: two overlapping instances would fight over the same cluster). An upgrade takes the panel/API down for the rollout window — seconds normally, longer if the new image still has to be imported.
If the new pod cannot start (bad tag, missing image), the installer's rollout wait fails after 180s and prints kubectl describe diagnostics: you see ErrImagePull/ImagePullBackOff there instead of a silent hang.

What the installer checks before it runs anything it downloaded:

Download	Check
`felis-linux-<arch>` (release channel)	its sha256 must match the release's `SHA256SUMS`; a release without one, or a mismatch, is compiled from the same tag instead
the image tars `felis-image-*-linux-<arch>.tar`, their listing `felis-images-linux-<arch>.txt`, `felis-velocity.jar` (release channel, `FELIS_ARTIFACT_DIR`)	each sha256 must match the release's `SHA256SUMS`; the listing must give one known role per line with sha256 digests, and each image must be in containerd under the digest the listing names once its tar is imported. An asset that fails is built on the host instead (§15c); from `FELIS_ARTIFACT_DIR` the install stops
k3s's own images (`k3s-airgap-images-<arch>.tar.zst`)	against the k3s release's `sha256sum-<arch>.txt`; a mismatch leaves k3s pulling them from Docker Hub
k3s (fresh install, or `FELIS_UPGRADE_DEPS=1`)	the install script is read at `FELIS_K3S_VERSION`'s tag (default `v1.36.4+k3s1`), and it checks the binary against that release's sha256 list
cloudflared (when absent, or `FELIS_UPGRADE_DEPS=1`)	release `FELIS_CLOUDFLARED_VERSION` (default `2026.9.1`) against a pinned sha256; another version needs `FELIS_CLOUDFLARED_SHA256`
Go toolchain (nano, source builds)	pinned sha256 per architecture; another version needs `FELIS_GO_SHA256`
the registry and PostgreSQL images	pinned by digest (`registry:2.8.3@sha256:a3d8…`, `postgres:18.6-trixie@sha256:5a5a…`); a release's copy must carry that name and digest
Limbo, its spawn schematic, Paper, LuckPerms, Velocity	the builds and sha256s in `deploy/game-stack.lock`; each image build and the proxy install refuse a download that hashes differently (§15b)
the Temurin JRE the proxy runs on	release `25.0.4.1+1` against a pinned sha256 per architecture
base images of the felis, limbo, lobby and paper images	pinned by digest in each `Dockerfile`

On a public repository each release also carries a signed build-provenance attestation. Check a downloaded binary with gh attestation verify felis-linux-amd64 --repo FelisMC/Felis; it names the workflow run and commit that built it.

Each release runs under its own image tag, felis/felis:v1.2.3 (a source build's stamp v1.2.3+gabc1234 becomes v1.2.3-gabc1234; a build that reports no version uses :demo). At the end of an upgrade the installer prints the tag it moved away from, and keeps it in /etc/felis/previous-felis-image. Roll back with:

kubectl -n felis rollout undo deployment/felis-api deployment/felis-operator
kubectl -n felis rollout status deploy/felis-api

rollout undo returns each Deployment to its previous ReplicaSet, which names the previous release's tag. That image is normally still on the node; if the image GC collected it, the registry re-serves it (§13b): the pruner keeps the five newest felis/felis tags and every image a game pod still runs. A rerun of the same version reuses its tag and restarts both Deployments onto the rebuilt image, so after such a rerun undo lands on that same tag again. The next installer run re-applies the bundle and moves the image to whatever that run installs.

A platform upgrade leaves running game servers alone. Their init containers run the felis image too; a running server keeps the one it started with and picks up the new release on its next start. A release that changes the game pod in any other way still restarts running servers once, as a server edit does.

What a rerun restarts. Each of these drops every connected player (or cuts felis-api's open transactions), so the installer restarts one only when what it runs changed:

Component	Restarted when
`felis-velocity` (the proxy)	its unit, the JRE, `velocity.jar`, `velocity.toml`, the forwarding secret, the felis-link settings (all but `service-token`, which the plugin re-reads) or a plugin jar changed, or it was not running. The fingerprint lives in `/etc/felis/velocity.fingerprint`; delete it to force a restart.
login and lobby pods	the rebuilt limbo or lobby image has a new image ID (`/etc/felis/system-server-images`). The installer then pins that server's `spec.image` to the digest its tag names now (`felis pin-images --system login\|lobby`) and the operator rolls the pod onto it, each on its own; with the registry unreachable it recreates the pod instead. The installer turns off BuildKit's default provenance attestation (`BUILDX_NO_DEFAULT_ATTESTATIONS=1`): it records the build time, which would give every rebuild a new ID.
felis-postgres	the release moved `POSTGRES_IMAGE` or changed the pod; a few seconds without the API. A rerun that changes neither leaves it running.
felis-api, felis-operator, the registry pod (its gate and GC containers run the felis binary)	the image tag changed (an upgrade), or a same-version rerun rebuilt it.

PostgreSQL across reruns. The database runs in k3s from the image the release pins, so a distribution upgrade never moves it. The installer refuses to start a PostgreSQL whose major version differs from the cluster in /var/lib/felis/postgres and names the dump-and-restore path (docs/operations.md §4). The first rerun of a release with felis-postgres on a host an earlier release installed moves the database off the host PostgreSQL (docs/operations.md §4, "The database's move into k3s"), and removes that release's felis-postgres-firewall.service. On Arch the installer's pacman -Syu keeps holding the host postgresql package back while its cluster exists: that cluster is the copy a rollback of the move starts again.

rollout undo reverts the image only. The upgrade's database migrations stay applied; when they are the problem, restore the pre-migrate bundle the upgrade took (§16, "Roll back an upgrade that broke the database").

Schema guard. felis-api, the reaper, the off-site copy and felis migrate up compare the migrations the database records with the ones their build embeds, as sets. A database a newer release migrated stops them with database schema is newer than this felis build: it records migration 0026, and this build knows migrations up to 0025, so an undo across an upgrade that migrated shows up as felis-api in CrashLoopBackOff until the pre-migrate bundle is restored. A database still missing migrations stops felis-api, the reaper and the off-site copy with database schema is behind this felis build until felis migrate up runs; felis setup's preflight applies them itself. [PG-TESTED]

A failed rerun and the host binary. The installer replaces /usr/local/bin/felis early (the steps after it run the new binary) and keeps the old one as felis.prev until the new one is in use. A run that fails before the database migrations start puts the old binary back, so the host timers and felis setup keep matching the database and the control plane that are still running; a rerun continues from there. Once migrations have started, the new binary stays. [VM-VERIFIED]

15b. Game images, pinned builds, and moving a world to a newer Minecraft

Each release pins the upstream builds it installs in deploy/game-stack.lock: the Limbo CI build and its Minecraft version, the Paper build for that version, LuckPerms and Velocity, each with its sha256. Every host installing one release builds the same login gate, lobby and plain-Paper image, and a rerun of the same release rebuilds nothing. Moving the stack to newer upstream builds is a release change: bash deploy/update-game-stack-lock.sh resolves and hashes upstream's newest builds and rewrites the lock (--check only reports whether upstream moved on). Two installer knobs leave the lock:

FELIS_GAME_STACK=latest resolves upstream's newest builds at install time, hashes the ones that publish no digest, and warns that they are not the release's builds.
FELIS_VELOCITY_VERSION=<minor> installs that minor's newest Velocity build (content-addressed, so still sha256-checked).

FELIS_JRE_VERSION picks the proxy's Java feature release (default 25, pinned to Temurin 25.0.4.1+1). A JRE the installer put there moves to the pinned build on the next rerun; a JRE from any other vendor is left in place.

The platform's game images live under mutable tags (registry.felis.svc:5000/felis/paper:demo): an installer run that builds a different stack pushes the new build over the same tag. A server never follows that tag on its own. felis-api stores the image a server is created with pinned to the digest the tag named at that moment (…/felis/paper:demo@sha256:…), and the installer's pin_user_server_images step pins any older server still on a bare tag before it pushes the new builds. Kubernetes pulls a digest-qualified ref by the digest, so a pinned server wakes on exactly the build it was created on, however often the tag moves. The login and lobby servers are pinned the same way, by the installer, each time it moves them onto a new build, so kubectl -n minecraft get minecraftserver login -o jsonpath='{.spec.image}' names the build the login gate runs.

Each installer run also pushes every game build under a tag no later run rewrites, <Minecraft version>-<12 hex of the image id> (felis/paper:26.2-3f9c0a1b2c4d). Whitelist one of those to create servers on a specific Minecraft version after :demo has moved on.

Moving an existing world to a newer build is an explicit step: pick the image in the panel's Edit server dialog (re-picking the current tag moves it to that tag's newest build) and tick the backup confirmation. Over the API the same PATCH needs "confirmImageChange": true, or it is refused with 409 image_change_unconfirmed. Back the world up first: Minecraft upgrades chunks as it loads them, and the old version cannot open them again. The audit log keeps image_from/image_to for every change, so the exact previous build can be set back (it is admitted by its tag) together with a restore of the pre-upgrade backup. That rollback works while the registry still holds the old build: a build no server and no whitelist entry names is pruned after 24 hours, and the 5 newest builds of each felis/ repository are kept regardless (§9).

Symptom	Cause	Fix
Create/edit refused with `image_not_in_registry`	the whitelisted tag was never pushed to the internal registry, or was deleted	push or rebuild the image, then retry
Create/edit refused with `registry_unavailable`	felis-api could not reach `registry.felis.svc:5000`	`kubectl -n felis get pods -l app.kubernetes.io/component=registry`; check the `felis-registry-ingress` NetworkPolicy still admits felis-api
Installer warns `could not pin every user server`	the registry was down, or a server names a tag the registry lost	fix the registry, then `sudo felis pin-images` before starting those servers; a server whose tag is gone keeps its bare tag until an admin picks a new image
Installer warns `could not pin the login system server` (or lobby)	the registry did not answer right after the push	the installer recreated the pod instead, which starts the new build only while `spec.image` names the bare tag; rerun the installer once `kubectl -n felis get pods -l app.kubernetes.io/component=registry` is Ready
A running server restarted during an installer re-run	it was pinned in place: the operator rolled it onto the pinned ref, the build it already ran	nothing; it happens once per server
Create/edit refused with `the registry no longer holds build …`	the image names a digest the pruner deleted: nothing referenced it for 24 hours (§9)	pick a current tag; whitelist the versioned tag of a build you want kept

15c. The installer builds on the host although it installs a release

A release install takes its images and the Velocity plugin from the release's assets (operations §1, "Where the binary and the images come from"). When one cannot be used the installer names it and the reason, and builds that image with Docker instead (the registry and PostgreSQL images are pulled from Docker Hub). Nothing unchecked is used either way [SH-TESTED]. Each download is tried three times, five seconds apart, before it counts as failed, and a transfer that stalls under 1 KiB/s for a minute is cut off and tried again.

Preflight counts no Docker builds for a release install, so the first build it falls back to checks the room first: Docker's images and build cache take about 8 GiB under /var/lib/containerd (2 GiB when Docker already has a cache there). Without it the install stops before Docker is installed, with building here what the release did not supply takes about … MiB under /var/lib/containerd, and … has … MiB free; nothing has been built. Rerun once the asset downloads (the messages above it say which one failed), free that space, or set FELIS_PREFLIGHT=warn to build anyway [SH-TESTED].

Message	Meaning	What to do
`release vX publishes no SHA256SUMS … building them on this host instead`	the release predates release assets, or release.yml is still uploading them	nothing for an old release; for a new one, rerun once the release page lists `SHA256SUMS`
`SHA256SUMS lists no <file>` or `could not download <file> from release vX`	the release lacks that asset (a partial upload)	rerun later; the host build is correct meanwhile
`downloaded <file> hashes to …, but release vX's SHA256SUMS says …`	the download was corrupted, or the asset was replaced after `SHA256SUMS` was written	rerun: the bad copy is gone and is fetched again; the same mismatch every time means the asset itself is bad, so report it
`the release's image listing … is malformed`	`felis-images-linux-<arch>.txt` does not parse	report it; every image is built on the host
`the release's registry image is …, but this installer runs …`	the release's base tar carries another digest than this `bootstrap.sh` pins: the installer and the release are from different versions	run the installer read at the release's tag (`felis update --panel` prints that command)
`k3s containerd holds no <image> from <tar>`	the tar was imported but did not hold the image under the listed digest	`sudo k3s ctr images ls \| grep felis` shows what it holds; report it
`FELIS_ARTIFACT_DIR: …`, and the install stops	an asset is missing from the directory or fails its checksum; nothing is built from a directory	copy the named file from the release again and rerun

An install that stops part way leaves the downloaded tars in /var/lib/felis/artifacts; the rerun reuses those that still match SHA256SUMS and deletes the directory once the images are in the registry.

16. Control-plane database backups and disaster recovery

The PostgreSQL database behind felis-api holds everything that is not a world: accounts, passkeys, Minecraft account links, server ownership, quotas, audit logs, and the world_backups index that maps an archive (§10) back to its owner. Losing it orphans every world archive. It runs in k3s as the felis-postgres Deployment, with its cluster on the host in /var/lib/felis/postgres; felis db runs pg_dump, psql and pg_restore inside that pod (the host config's [database] deployment) and keeps the bundles on the host.

What runs, and where the bundles go

felis-db-backup.timer runs felis db backup daily at FELIS_DB_BACKUP_TIME (default *-*-* 03:30:00, plus up to 15 min random delay). Persistent=true catches up at boot after the host was off at that time. The installer takes the first backup during the install, so a broken pipeline shows up there. [CODE-ONLY; unit and timer content GO-TESTED in deploy/bootstrap_test.sh]
Every upgrade (felis migrate up, which the installer runs) takes a pre-migrate bundle first when the database already has data and a migration is pending, and applies nothing if that backup fails (pre-migration backup failed, nothing applied). [GO-TESTED]
Every restore takes a pre-restore bundle of the database it is about to replace (skip with -no-safety-backup). [GO-TESTED]

Bundles land in FELIS_DB_BACKUP_DIR (default /var/lib/felis/db-backups, mode 0700; outside /var/lib/rancher so a k3s reinstall cannot take them along). One bundle is felis-db-<UTC stamp>-<label>.tar:

Member	Content
`MANIFEST.json`	version, schema version, `pg_dump --version`, sha256 of every member
`db.dump`	`pg_dump --format=custom` of the `felis` database
`state/etc/felis/...`	every file in `/etc/felis`: `secrets.env` (DB password, forwarding secret, caller and registry tokens), `felis.host.toml`, `felis.pod.toml`, the `felis.toml` symlink, `offsite.env` (bucket credentials and encryption key), `smtp-password`, `uploads-s3-access-key` and `uploads-s3-secret-key` (the mail relay password and the uploads bucket keys `felis setup` took), the panel TLS pair, and the installer's own markers (`system-server-images`, `velocity.fingerprint`). `bootstrap.done` is left out on purpose
`k8s/minecraftservers.json`	every MinecraftServer, status and server-side metadata stripped, ready for `kubectl apply`. The export is tried 3 times, 10 s apart; when the cluster still does not answer, the bundle is written without it and the manifest records why (next section)

next to a .sha256 sidecar in sha256sum format. A bundle contains the secrets; treat it like /etc/felis itself. Retention per label: daily 14 (FELIS_DB_BACKUP_KEEP), pre-migrate 10, pre-restore 5, offsite 1 (taken by the off-site copy, §16), manual never pruned.

Installer knobs: FELIS_DB_BACKUP_DIR, FELIS_DB_BACKUP_KEEP, FELIS_DB_BACKUP_TIME, FELIS_DB_BACKUP_METRICS and FELIS_PRE_MIGRATE_BACKUP (below).

Is the newest backup fresh?

Four places answer, all with the same 26 h limit on the newest daily bundle, the one felis-db-backup.timer writes. A manual, pre-migrate or offsite bundle taken since counts for a restore and leaves the alarm standing: the timer has still stopped, and that bundle only ages from here.

The panel: Admin → Maintenance & Backups shows the newest backup, its kind and size, and turns red with the fix commands when the daily one is missing or overdue (read from the db_backup_last platform setting each backup writes; its daily_at is the newest daily bundle on disk when it was written).
sudo felis db check exits 1 with the reason; sudo felis db list shows every bundle with its age.
The watchdog mails the owners (§14).
Prometheus: FelisDBBackupStale (critical) and FelisDBBackupMetricMissing (warning) in deploy/alerts/. They read felis_db_backup_last_success_timestamp_seconds, which each daily run writes to FELIS_DB_BACKUP_METRICS (default /var/lib/node_exporter/textfile_collector/felis_db_backup.prom). Point node-exporter's --collector.textfile.directory at that directory, or FelisDBBackupMetricMissing fires after 2 h.

When a backup is overdue:

sudo systemctl status felis-db-backup.timer          # enabled? next run?
sudo journalctl -u felis-db-backup -n 50 --no-pager   # why the last run failed
sudo systemctl start felis-db-backup.service         # run the daily backup now; clears the alarm

A bundle without the MinecraftServer objects. When the cluster does not answer the export (k3s kubectl get minecraftservers) three times running, the bundle is still written, since it holds the database, but a restore from it brings back no servers. felis db backup then exits 1 (the timer's run shows failed) after wrote ... and the reason; the panel card turns amber (incomplete) with the reason and the commands; the watchdog mails the owners (the newest control-plane database backup ... lacks the MinecraftServer objects) while that bundle is the newest; felis db verify and felis offsite list/fetch-db name the gap. A pre-migrate or pre-restore bundle goes the same way without stopping the upgrade or the restore, whose rollback needs the database alone. The bundle the off-site copy takes after copying archives refuses to go without them and is tried again next pass. Once sudo k3s kubectl get minecraftservers -A answers, run sudo felis db backup. [GO-TESTED: internal/dbbackup, cmd/felis, internal/watchdog; the panel card in DBBackupCard.test.tsx]

Common failures: felis-postgres not running (kubectl exec reports no running pod, or pg_dump: ... connection refused; next section); k3s: executable file not found from a felis that runs with neither /usr/local/bin on PATH nor k3s anywhere else; the backup directory's disk full (the half-written .partial is removed and the previous bundles stay intact); pg_dump: server version mismatch when an external database (no deployment in [database]) is newer than the host's client tools (install the matching postgresql client package).

felis-postgres is not running, or never became ready

The installer stops with felis-postgres did not become ready after 10 minutes and prints the pod's events; the watchdog reports the Deployment the same way it reports felis-api. Look at the pod:

sudo k3s kubectl -n felis get pods -l app.kubernetes.io/component=postgres -o wide
sudo k3s kubectl -n felis describe deploy/felis-postgres | tail -n 30
sudo k3s kubectl -n felis logs deploy/felis-postgres --tail=60

What it says	Cause	Fix
`ImagePullBackOff` / `ErrImagePull` on `postgres`	the node cannot reach Docker Hub and has no copy	§8e, "The platform's own images on an air-gapped node"
`CreateContainerConfigError`, `secret "felis-postgres" not found`	the superuser Secret is gone	rerun the installer, which makes a new one. The image reads it only when it creates a cluster; the installer and `felis db` reach the database over the pod's socket
the log says `Permission denied` on `/var/lib/postgresql/18/docker`	the hostPath lost its owner (uid 999) or, with SELinux enforcing, its `container_file_t` label (a restore of `/var/lib/felis` by hand, `restorecon` without the installer's rule)	rerun the installer, which sets both; by hand: `sudo chown -R 999:999 /var/lib/felis/postgres` and `sudo restorecon -R /var/lib/felis/postgres`
the log says `database files are incompatible with server`	the cluster was made by another major version	docs/operations.md §4, "PostgreSQL major versions"
`Pending`, `Insufficient memory`	the node is full	§13b

Query the database by hand from inside the pod, as the superuser over its socket:

sudo k3s kubectl -n felis exec -it deploy/felis-postgres -c postgres -- psql -U postgres felis

The copy an earlier release's host PostgreSQL still holds, from before the move into k3s, stays on the host; docs/operations.md §4 covers going back to it.

Check a bundle

sudo felis db verify felis-db-20260924T033012Z-daily.tar   # bare names resolve in the backup dir
sha256sum -c felis-db-20260924T033012Z-daily.tar.sha256    # on a copy, without felis

verify checks the sidecar, every member against the manifest, that nothing is missing or unlisted, and that the manifest comes first. It does not touch the database.

Restore on the same host (undo a mistake)

kubectl -n felis scale deployment felis-api felis-operator --replicas=0
sudo felis db restore -yes felis-db-20260924T033012Z-daily.tar
sudo felis migrate up -config /etc/felis/felis.host.toml
kubectl -n felis scale deployment felis-api felis-operator --replicas=1

Without -yes, restore prints what the bundle holds and exits 2.
It refuses while other clients are connected (other clients are connected to the database (N)) and prints the scale command; -force overrides, for a client you know is idle.
The replay is one transaction: it drops everything the felis role owns and loads the dump. Any failure rolls back and leaves the database exactly as it was (rolled back, the database is unchanged, with the psql and pg_restore errors). [PG-TESTED]
The database before the restore is in the pre-restore bundle it names; restoring that one undoes the restore.
migrate up brings an older bundle's schema up to the running release. Nothing migrates at startup, so skip it only when you are rolling back to the release that wrote the bundle (next section).
Restore replaces the database only. World data (PVCs and archives, §10, §13) is not in the bundle and is not touched; a server created after the bundle keeps its PVC but loses its owner row.

Roll back an upgrade that broke the database

The installer's migrations only roll forward. The pre-migrate bundle taken by the upgrade is the way back:

kubectl -n felis scale deployment felis-api felis-operator --replicas=0
sudo felis db list | grep pre-migrate                  # newest one is the upgrade's
sudo felis db restore -yes <that bundle>
kubectl -n felis rollout undo deploy/felis-api
kubectl -n felis rollout undo deploy/felis-operator
kubectl -n felis scale deployment felis-api felis-operator --replicas=1

Do not run felis migrate up here: the host binary is already the new release and would re-apply the migrations you are rolling back. Bring the host back in line by installing the earlier release from its own assets, with the installer read at that same tag (v1.2.3 here):

curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/FelisMC/Felis/v1.2.3/deploy/bootstrap.sh \
  | sudo FELIS_RELEASE=v1.2.3 bash

FELIS_RELEASE makes the installer install that release where it would otherwise resolve the newest one, which would install the new release again and re-apply its migrations. It is refused together with FELIS_REF, FELIS_ARTIFACT_DIR, FELIS_SKIP_FETCH or FELIS_VERSION_BOOTSTRAP=dev, and an unpublished tag stops the install before anything changes. [SH-TESTED]

An installer older than FELIS_RELEASE ignores it and installs the newest. curl -fsSL <that URL> | grep -c FELIS_RELEASE prints 0 for one of those; run it with FELIS_REF=v1.2.3 instead, which builds that tag from source (slower, and it needs the build resources of §15c).

Whole-host disaster recovery: what comes back, and from where

When the host (or its disk) is gone, everything Felis needs comes back from the off-site bucket (next sections) plus a fresh install. What the host holds:

Data	On the host	In the bucket	Brought back by	Lost at most
Control-plane database (accounts, passkeys, ownership, quotas, audit, submissions, the `world_backups` index)	felis-postgres, `/var/lib/felis/postgres`	every bundle, copied within the hour of being written, plus a fresh one after every pass that copied a world archive	`fetch-db`, `db restore`	changes since the newest bundle: up to a day plus an hour with the daily timer
Host state (`/etc/felis`: secrets, both `felis.toml` copies, `offsite.env`, the mail relay password and uploads bucket keys, panel TLS pair)	`/etc/felis`	inside every bundle	`tar -x` of the bundle's `state/`	as the database
MinecraftServer objects	k3s	inside every bundle (`k8s/minecraftservers.json`)	`kubectl apply`	as the database
World archives (reaper, "Back up now", pre-restore snapshots)	`felis-backups` volume	each one within the hour, followed by a bundle listing it	`fetch-worlds`	archives written in the last hour
Live worlds	`world-*` volumes under `/var/lib/rancher/k3s/storage`	only as their archives	a restore from the newest archive (§10)	everything since that world's newest archive
User images	`registry` volume	hourly; image lists kept 14 days	`fetch-images`	images pushed in the last hour
Submission uploads (modpacks awaiting or past review)	`felis-uploads` volume	hourly; upload lists kept 14 days	`fetch-uploads`	uploads of the last hour
The Cloudflare Tunnel connector (when the panel is behind one)	`/etc/felis/cloudflared.yml`; `/root/.cloudflared/cert.pem` and `<tunnel-id>.json`; `cloudflared-felis.service`	the config inside every bundle; the login certificate, the tunnel's credentials and the unit are not copied	the Cloudflare step of `sudo felis setup` (step 11 below)	nothing: the tunnel, its DNS records and the Access application live at Cloudflare
Platform images, Velocity, the JRE, build tools	registry, `/opt/felis`	not copied	the installer builds and pushes them again	nothing
k3s itself (its token, CA, datastore, Secrets, Deployments)	`/var/lib/rancher/k3s`	not copied	the installer makes a new single-node cluster and renders every Secret and Deployment from `/etc/felis`	nothing: no Felis data lives only there

Live worlds are the gap. A world's current state exists only in its volume; the bucket holds the archives the reaper, an owner's "Back up now" or a pre-restore snapshot wrote. A world that was never archived comes back as a server with an empty world. Tell owners to back up before anything they would hate to lose, and treat the newest archive's age (the server's backup page) as that world's recovery point.

For a smaller database loss window, give the installer a tighter FELIS_DB_BACKUP_TIME (any systemd calendar, e.g. *-*-* 00/6:30:00 for every 6 hours) with a matching FELIS_DB_BACKUP_KEEP, on every installer run; the hourly off-site copy picks each bundle up within the hour.

How long a rebuild takes is mostly transfer time. The installer on a blank host builds and pushes every platform image, so it runs longer than an upgrade and depends on the host's network; the database restore takes seconds to minutes; the three fetches move what sudo felis offsite status reports the bucket holding (images, uploads, world archives) at the bucket's bandwidth, and each skips what is already in place, so an interrupted one resumes. Write those sizes down with the bucket's download rate and you have the recovery time for your install. A whole-host rehearsal on a spare machine, once per release, is the way to know it for sure. The spare follows the steps below without steps 8 and 11. It finds the production host named in the bucket and stands by, so it copies nothing into the bucket, prunes nothing there and, while production keeps writing, mails none of the owners its restored database holds. A second connector on the production tunnel would take a share of the real visitors, so the spare leaves the tunnel alone and is reached by its own address (step 10 moves it to one).

The order below matters: the state goes in before the installer so it reuses the old secrets and bucket; the images go back before the database so the servers the database restores find the digests they pin, inside the pruner's 24-hour grace; the MinecraftServers go back with the database that names their owners; the worlds come after them because a restore needs a server to restore into. Mail is checked before the domain moves, because a move can cost passkeys and email codes are the way back in; the domain moves after the MinecraftServers are applied, since the login gate's env carries it.

Rebuild on a new host (the old one is gone)

This needs the off-site copy (next section) or a bundle you copied off the old host yourself, plus the off-site encryption key if the copy is in the bucket.

Get the newest bundle. From the bucket, with any felis binary of the same or a newer release (the felis-linux-<arch> release asset runs on its own; this works from any machine that can reach the bucket):
```
export FELIS_OFFSITE_ACCESS_KEY=... FELIS_OFFSITE_SECRET_KEY=... FELIS_OFFSITE_KEY=...
sudo -E felis offsite fetch-db -endpoint https://s3.example.com -bucket felis-backups \
     [-region ...] [-prefix ...] latest
```
It writes the bundle into /var/lib/felis/db-backups (-dir to change), checks it (felis db verify) and names it, with when it was taken, the release and schema that took it, and how many accounts and servers its database holds. Read those before going on. A wrong key fails with object does not decrypt with this key (naming the bucket's key id and this key's, once the bucket records one) and writes nothing. For a copy you made yourself, check it with sha256sum -c felis-db-....tar.sha256.
latest is the newest bundle, unless that one holds no servers and at most one account while an older one holds more. That is the database a rebuilt host copies off-site when it takes the bucket over before anyone restores onto it (with an older release, within its first hour), so fetch-db latest refuses it and names up to three older bundles with their counts; fetch the one you want by name in place of latest (felis offsite list shows them all, each with its counts). A bundle fetched by name that looks like a new install's is written with a warning. Bundles from releases before the counts were recorded show not recorded.
Put the old host's state in place before installing, so the installer reuses the same DB password, caller tokens, forwarding secret, the mail relay password and uploads bucket keys felis setup took, and the [offsite] bucket with its credentials and key (offsite.env):
```
sudo install -d -m 0700 /etc/felis
sudo tar -xpf felis-db-....tar -C / --strip-components=1 state/etc/felis
```
Run the installer as for a first install. bootstrap.done is not in the bundle, so it takes the fresh-install path, creates the empty database with the restored password and migrates it. It finds [offsite] in the restored felis.host.toml, turns the hourly copy back on and reports that another host writes the bucket: this host was built from its backup, so it stands by and copies nothing there until step 8, and ends with OFF-SITE COPY ON STANDBY.
Push the user images back into the new registry:
```
sudo felis offsite fetch-images
```
It restores the newest image list in the bucket (-at <stamp> for an older one; felis offsite list shows them) through the registry's loopback port as the platform principal, verifying every manifest and layer against its digest, and pushes only what the registry lacks. The pruner counts a restored image as freshly pushed and keeps it for 24 hours; finish the database step within that window so the restored servers and whitelist entries keep naming it. When the new host has already taken the bucket over and recorded its still-empty registry, fetch-images refuses that newest list and names the version to pass with -at; fetch-uploads does the same.
Put the submission uploads back:
```
sudo felis offsite fetch-uploads
```
It writes every upload of the newest upload list (-at <stamp> for an older one) into the felis-uploads volume, owned by the control plane's uid, checking each against its sha256, and leaves one already in place alone.

Restore the database and bring the servers back:

kubectl -n felis scale deployment felis-api felis-operator --replicas=0
sudo felis db restore -yes -no-safety-backup /var/lib/felis/db-backups/felis-db-....tar
sudo felis migrate up -config /etc/felis/felis.host.toml
kubectl -n felis scale deployment felis-api felis-operator --replicas=1
tar -xOf felis-db-....tar k8s/minecraftservers.json | kubectl apply -f -

When tar answers Not found in archive, the bundle lacks the MinecraftServer objects (fetch-db said so when it fetched it). Fetch the newest bundle felis offsite list shows without no MinecraftServer objects and apply its k8s/minecraftservers.json instead; servers that bundle does not list do not come back from it.

Bring the world archives back into the archive volume:
```
sudo felis offsite fetch-worlds
```
It fetches every archive the restored world_backups index lists as present and the volume lacks, provisioning the felis-backups volume first if nothing has used it yet (a short-lived felis-bind-felis-backups-* pod). It lists any it could not find in the bucket. Restore a world from its archive as usual (§10, §13). With the newest bundle restored, every archive in the bucket is listed; an older bundle leaves the archives copied after it unlisted, and the sync removes those once they pass the longest retention.
Make this host the one that writes the bucket, and send its first copy:
```
sudo felis offsite take-over          # names the host the bucket names now
sudo felis offsite take-over -yes
sudo systemctl start felis-offsite.service
```
Without -yes it names the host the bucket records and when that host last wrote it, and exits 4. With -yes it records this host; the old host, if it ever runs again, copies nothing more and says it was taken over. Skip this step on a rehearsal machine.
Check that this host can send mail, when the old one had a relay. Email codes are how users sign in without a passkey, and step 10 can cost them their passkeys. Run sudo felis setup, press e (configure email) on the status screen and save the pre-filled relay with its password typed again (the form never shows the stored one). Saving delivers one self-test message to the From address and writes nothing unless it arrives. A relay that admits senders by address, or an SPF record for the From domain that lists the old host's address, refuses this host or sends its mail to spam: add the new address there and save again. With no relay at all, an Owner who cannot sign in recovers with sudo felis breakGlass (§17).
Move the install to this host's address when its names still lead to the old one. The installer kept the bundle's root domain (its log says (reusing the installed domain)).
- The <old-address>.nip.io default resolves to the dead host by construction. Move it:
```
sudo felis domain set <new-address>.nip.io       # the plan
sudo felis domain set -yes <new-address>.nip.io
sudo felis domain check
```
  It runs after step 6 because the MinecraftServers applied there carry the domain in the login gate's env. The plan counts the passkeys that stop working; their users sign in with an email code (step 9) and register a new one. docs/operations.md §6 has the rest of what it moves.
- A domain of your own stays. Point its records at the new address: <root>, *.<root>, console.<root> and op.console.<root>, or only <root> and *.<root> when the tunnel serves the panel. Confirm each with dig +short <name> before going on: felis domain check warns while a name does not resolve and accepts any address once it does. Lower the records' TTL beforehand if the old host is still around to plan with.
Bring the Cloudflare edge back, when the old host served the panel through a tunnel. The bundle carries /etc/felis/cloudflared.yml; the login certificate (/root/.cloudflared/cert.pem), the tunnel's credentials (/root/.cloudflared/<tunnel-id>.json) and the cloudflared-felis unit stay behind with the old disk, so the panel hostnames answer Cloudflare error 1033 until a connector runs here.
Run sudo felis setup, press c (change connection) on the status screen and choose Cloudflare Tunnel + Access. On the step's first screen press i to install cloudflared, then l for cloudflared tunnel login (browser consent on your account, which writes cert.pem); enter opens the form once both are in place. Enter an API token and the account ID, then the same Admit identity, hostnames and tunnel name as before. The hostnames come pre-filled from the restored config and the tunnel name defaults to felis; for another name, look up the id on the tunnel: line of the restored cloudflared.yml in Zero Trust → Networks → Tunnels.
The step finds the existing tunnel by name and fetches its credentials again, points the panel records at it, finds the existing Access application (so its audience stays the one the restored config names) and rewrites its policy, installs and starts cloudflared-felis, and closes the panel's NodePort once the tunnel serves. A kept copy of the old <tunnel-id>.json can go back into /root/.cloudflared (mode 0600) first; the step still needs cert.pem. A different tunnel name makes a second tunnel, moves the panel records to it and leaves the old one idle: delete that one in the dashboard afterwards. Skip this step on a rehearsal machine.

Check the rebuild before letting players in:

sudo felis db check                     # the database answers and has a fresh bundle
kubectl get minecraftservers -A         # every server the bundle held
kubectl -n minecraft get pods           # servers pull their pinned images (no ImagePullBackOff)
sudo felis offsite status               # the hourly copy runs from this host again
sudo felis domain check                 # every name, the certificate and the tunnel on the new address

A rehearsal machine that restored a tunnel install and moved to a nip.io name in step 10 fails the Cloudflare tunnel line, since the tunnel still routes production's names; that one failure is expected there.

In the panel, reached by its hostname (steps 10 and 11):

Sign in with an old account; accounts and passkeys come back with the database, except passkeys step 10 counted as lost.
Sign out and sign in again with an email code, to an Owner account whose inbox you read. The code arriving proves felis-api itself mails through the relay to an outside inbox; step 9's self-test came from the setup console and went to the From address. A code that never comes: §17.
Open a restored server's backup page and confirm its archives are listed, restore the newest one, start the server and join it at <name>.<root>.

Keep a copy somewhere else

A bundle on the same disk as the database protects against mistakes and bad upgrades, and a world archive on the same disk as the worlds protects against a deleted server. Neither survives losing the disk, and neither do the user images in the platform registry or the modpacks users uploaded for review. The installer's off-site copy sends all four to an S3-compatible bucket (AWS S3, Cloudflare R2, Backblaze B2, MinIO, ...), encrypted on this host:

FELIS_OFFSITE_ENDPOINT=https://<account>.r2.cloudflarestorage.com \
FELIS_OFFSITE_BUCKET=felis-backups \
FELIS_OFFSITE_ACCESS_KEY=... FELIS_OFFSITE_SECRET_KEY=... \
  bash deploy/bootstrap.sh          # or the curl | sudo bash one-liner

Optional: FELIS_OFFSITE_REGION, FELIS_OFFSITE_PREFIX (a key prefix, so one bucket can hold several installs) and FELIS_OFFSITE_DB_KEEP (default 30). The installer writes [offsite] into felis.toml, keeps the credentials and a generated encryption key in /etc/felis/offsite.env (mode 0600), and shows the key once, on the terminal. It stays out of the installer's output, so a 2>&1 | tee log, cloud-init's log or a CI artifact never holds it; with no terminal to show it on, the installer names the command that reads it from offsite.env instead. Store it in a password manager: the bucket holds only sealed objects, and without the key they cannot be read. A later re-run keeps the key; it refuses a FELIS_OFFSITE_KEY that differs from the one in offsite.env, since every object already in the bucket is sealed with it. Without a bucket the installer ends with NO OFF-SITE COPY. Installers before the fix for a pipe race in reading [offsite] could also end that way on a host that has a bucket, and removed felis-offsite.timer as they did; a re-run of the current installer puts it back. systemctl list-timers felis-offsite.timer shows whether the timer is there. [SH-TESTED] [VM-TESTED: a re-run that lost the race]

The bucket records which key sealed it: felis-key-id, the one object kept in the clear, holds the key's id (the key id: of felis offsite status), which names the key without revealing it. The first sync writes it; a bucket from before it was recorded is judged by whether the key opens its newest objects. The installer runs felis offsite check-key, and every sync checks before anything else. A key other than the bucket's (a reinstall that lost offsite.env and was given no FELIS_OFFSITE_KEY generates a new one) stops the sync before it copies or prunes anything, the installer ends with OFF-SITE COPY STOPPED, status exits 1 and the watchdog mails the owners at once. Set FELIS_OFFSITE_KEY in /etc/felis/offsite.env to the bucket's key and sudo systemctl start felis-offsite.service, or give [offsite] an empty bucket or prefix and re-run the installer. [GO-TESTED: TestSyncRefusesAnotherKeysBucket, TestCheckKey] [SH-TESTED] [VM-TESTED: MinIO, the other key's sync refused with the bucket unchanged, check-key 0/3, fetch-db naming both ids]

The bucket also names the host that writes it: felis-writer, rewritten by every sync, holds that host's id (kept in /var/lib/felis/offsite/host-id, which no bundle carries), its name and the time of its last run. A host restored from a bundle has the bucket's key and credentials but no id, so it finds another host named there and stands by: its syncs copy and prune nothing, felis offsite status names the host that writes the bucket and exits 1, and while that host ran in the last 3 hours the watchdog holds this host's mail (§14). Once it has not run for 3 hours, the watchdog mails this host's owners that it copies nothing into the bucket. A bucket that holds sealed objects and names no writer puts a host on standby too, except a host that copied to it with a release before writers were recorded, which claims it on its next sync. sudo felis offsite take-over names the host that writes the bucket; with -yes it records this host instead (step 8 of a rebuild). The host it replaced copies nothing from its next sync on: its status exits 1, and its watchdog mails its owners at once that the off-site copy has stopped. When that happened by mistake (a rehearsal machine took the bucket over), run sudo felis offsite take-over -yes on the production host to take it back. [GO-TESTED: TestLeasePlan, TestSyncStandsBy, TestOffsiteTakeOver, TestRestoredHostKeepsStandingBy] [SH-TESTED] [VM-TESTED: MinIO, a restored host standing by with the bucket unchanged, take-over, the old host displaced and taking it back, an older release's host claiming its prefix]

What runs:

felis-offsite.timer runs felis offsite sync hourly (plus up to 10 min random delay, Persistent=true). Each run copies every world archive whose row has no offsite_at yet and records it, copies the newest db_keep database bundles the bucket lacks and prunes older ones there, and deletes a world archive from the bucket once its row has been deleted and its retention (expires_at) has passed. An object already in the bucket at the right size is recorded without being sent again, so a run cut short resumes. [GO-TESTED: internal/offsite]
A run that copied a world archive then takes a fresh offsite database bundle (felis-db-<stamp>-offsite.tar, the same layout as a daily one, host state from -state-dir, default /etc/felis) and sends it, so the newest bundle in the bucket lists every archive there and a restore from it fetches them all. The host keeps one such bundle locally, and the bucket keeps it only while it is the newest; the db_keep count covers the other labels, so a busy day of snapshots never pushes the dailies out. A run that copied nothing, or whose newest bundle already postdates the last copy, takes none. The panel's backup card keeps watching felis-db-backup.timer alone. [GO-TESTED: internal/offsite, TestOffsiteSyncerSnapshotsAndSweeps] [PG-TESTED]
A world archive in the bucket that no row lists (the database came back from a bundle older than the archive) is removed once it has been in the bucket longer than the longest [archive] retention (retention, manual_retention, scheduled_retention); younger ones stay, and the run logs how many and when each goes. The sweep skips a database that lists no archive at all, so a sync against a database not restored yet removes nothing. [GO-TESTED: internal/offsite]
The same run copies the user images in the platform registry: every repository outside felis/ and mirror/, each manifest the registry's index lists and every layer it names, read through the loopback hostPort. A layer shared by many images is stored once. The installer pushes felis/ and mirror/ again on a new host, but at new digests, so from those the run copies only the revisions a MinecraftServer or a whitelist entry pins by digest (a server created from the platform's Paper image, for one), without their tags; a restore puts them back by digest and leaves the installer's tags alone. When the set changed, a new version of the image list is written; versions replaced more than 14 days ago are dropped together with the layers only they named, so an image deleted by mistake stays restorable for two weeks (fetch-images -at). A manifest the registry lost mid-run keeps its earlier copy and is listed under not whole: in status. The copy covers the in-cluster registry that [registry] url names; -registry host:port points it elsewhere, -registry off skips images. [VM-TESTED: 16 images, 638 MiB, restored into an empty registry at the same digests]
It also copies the submission uploads (sub-*/context.tar.gz on the felis-uploads volume, §8), the source an admin rebuilds an approved image from. Identical uploads are stored once; the upload list is versioned and kept for 14 days like the image list (fetch-uploads -at). A context is read again only when its size or modification time changed. It runs when [registry] user_uploads_context is a local path (the installer's default); -uploads-dir names the directory by hand, -uploads-pvc "" skips it. [VM-TESTED: 17 uploads in 10 objects, 200 MiB, restored byte-identical]
Objects are worlds/<archive>.fenc, db/<bundle>.fenc, registry/blobs/<sha256>.fenc, registry/manifests/<sha256>.fenc, registry/index/<stamp>.json.fenc, uploads/blobs/<sha256>.fenc and uploads/index/<stamp>.json.fenc: AES-256-GCM in 64 KiB segments, so truncation, reordering and a wrong key are all refused on the way back. felis-key-id and felis-writer next to them hold the key's id and the host writing the bucket in the clear.
A pass sends the database bundles first, then world archives, the bundle listing them, images and uploads. Each object has its own time limit: 10 minutes plus its size at 512 KiB/s (about 6 hours for 10 GiB). An archive the uplink cannot send in that time fails alone, stays pending and is tried again next pass; the rest of the pass still goes. A pass over a big archive can run for hours; the timer starts no second one meanwhile. An upload cut off restarts from the beginning of that object. [GO-TESTED: internal/offsite]
The reaper deletes an idle world only after its archive is in the bucket (§10).
The watchdog mails the owners when no sync has completed for 12 hours (the off-site copy last completed ... ago), and at once when the bucket refuses this host's key or another host took the bucket over.

Checking it:

sudo felis offsite status        # last run, errors, what the bucket holds, what waits
sudo felis offsite list          # the bundles, image lists and upload lists in the bucket, newest first
sudo felis offsite check-key     # whether offsite.env holds the key the bucket was sealed with
sudo journalctl -u felis-offsite -n 50 --no-pager
sudo systemctl start felis-offsite.service   # run one now

status exits 1 when no sync has completed in 12 hours. missing: lines are archives the database records but the volume no longer has (an archive removed by hand); there is nothing left to copy for those.

To change the bucket, edit [offsite] in /etc/felis/felis.host.toml (and offsite.env for new credentials) and re-run the installer; to turn the copy off, delete the section and re-run. Keeping the same key across buckets keeps old copies readable.

Without a bucket, copy the backup directory off the host on a schedule of your own (rsync -a root@felis-host:/var/lib/felis/db-backups/ /backups/felis-db/, with the .sha256 sidecars; sha256sum -c on the far side proves the copy). That covers the database only; the world archives are under the felis-backups volume's directory in /var/lib/rancher/k3s/storage/, the registry's images under the registry volume's (*_felis_registry) and the uploads under the felis-uploads volume's (*_felis_felis-uploads).

`FELIS_PRE_MIGRATE_BACKUP=0`

Skips the pre-migration snapshot (migrate up -no-backup). The installer warns loudly when it is set. Use it only when the snapshot cannot work and you have another backup, e.g. an external database newer than the host's pg_dump.

The public sign-in doors (/api/v1/auth/* except logout and the op-login status poll) have three limits of their own. Each answers 429 with a Retry-After header and a distinct error code. The doors that mail a code also answer 503 mail_unavailable on an install with no mail relay.

`rate_limited`: one address called the doors too often

Each client address gets 20 calls at once, refilled at 20 a minute, shared across every door. A person signing in makes three or four calls, so this only bites scripts. IPv6 clients share one limit per /64. Refusals count in felis_rate_limited_total{scope="auth_door"}; FelisSignInFlood fires when more than 10 a minute are refused for 10 minutes.

The address comes from [auth] client_ip_header:

Behind the Cloudflare tunnel it is CF-Connecting-IP. The edge setup writes it, and an install with an access_jwt_aud implies it. The header is trustworthy there because the same setup fences the panel NodePort to loopback, so every request reaching the API came through cloudflared.
Behind your own reverse proxy it is X-Forwarded-For (the rightmost entry, the one your proxy appended). Firewall the NodePort so only the proxy reaches it, or a direct caller can write any address it likes.
Unset, the TCP peer is used. Behind any proxy every visitor then shares the proxy's address and one limit, so everyone gets rate_limited at once. The felis api log says at start which it keys on (sign-in rate limit keys on ...). Set the header in /etc/felis/felis.toml and /etc/felis/felis.pod.toml, then felis converge.

`mail_rate_limited`: the install-wide mail budget is spent

Every code and notice the API mails spends one token of a single budget, [smtp] max_per_hour (default 120; a quarter of it may go at once), so a flood cannot burn the relay's quota and get the sending account suspended. While it is spent, every address gets the same 429 and nothing reaches the relay. felis_mail_total{result="throttled"} counts refusals and FelisMailBudgetExhausted fires on the first one. Look at felis_rate_limited_total first: a flood shows there. If sign-ins are real, raise max_per_hour to what your relay allows.

FelisMailDeliveryFailing is the other half: the relay itself refused mail (felis_mail_total{result="failed"}, 502 mail_undeliverable to the caller). The relay's reason is in the felis-api log.

`mail_unavailable`: no mail relay

With no [smtp] section every door that mails a code answers 503 mail_unavailable before minting one: email sign-in, op.console sign-in, email verification, and the email step-up for sensitive changes and migration. The public doors answer before looking up the address, so every address gets the same reply. Sign-in is by passkey only, and a verified email stops counting as a way into the account (it is no longer offered as a re-verification factor). Codes are never logged: felis api says at start [smtp] not configured. Run felis setup and configure email to open the doors.

Relay refused for lacking TLS

A relay on port 465 is spoken to over TLS from the first byte. On any other port Felis upgrades with STARTTLS, and when the relay does not offer it the send fails with smtp: <host>:<port> does not offer STARTTLS (502 mail_undeliverable to the caller, the full text in the felis-api log, and the same error on the felis setup email screen). Without TLS anyone on the path reads the codes, and anyone who can rewrite the conversation can strip the STARTTLS offer, so this is the default for every relay except one on this host (localhost, 127.0.0.0/8, ::1). Use port 465 or a relay that offers STARTTLS. For a relay you reach over a link you trust, set require_tls = false under [smtp] in /etc/felis/felis.toml and /etc/felis/felis.pod.toml; installer re-runs and the setup email screen keep it. felis api warns at start whenever codes may go out without TLS.

`otp_account_locked`: ten wrong codes in 24 hours

Ten wrong email codes for one account within 24 hours, counted across every code it was sent, lock that account's email-code sign-in until 24 hours after the first miss. The public doors answer a locked account exactly like a wrong code, and the owner gets one mail saying so. Signed-in doors (email verification, migration step-up) answer 429 otp_account_locked. Passkey sign-in keeps working. Each lock is audited as auth.otp.locked and counted in felis_auth_otp_lockouts_total{purpose} (FelisOTPAccountLocked).

To lift a lock early once you have confirmed the owner locked themselves out:

sudo k3s kubectl -n felis exec deploy/felis-postgres -c postgres -- psql -U postgres felis -c \
  "DELETE FROM otp_failure_windows WHERE user_id = (SELECT id FROM users WHERE username = '<name>');"

Who tried: the audit trail

Every refused sign-in writes an auth.<door>.failed row (payload reason: bad_code, no_account, staff_account, not_staff, bad_assertion, ...) and counts in felis_auth_failures_total{door,reason}; FelisSignInFailures fires above 30 in 15 minutes. The first refusal of each throttled burst writes auth.rate_limited with the source address. Rows carry actor_user_id (the account, the column to attribute by), client_ip (the same address the limit keys on) and user_agent. actor is display text: a verified email or the username, never an address the caller set without verifying.

sudo k3s kubectl -n felis exec deploy/felis-postgres -c postgres -- psql -U postgres felis -c "
  SELECT created_at, action, actor, client_ip, payload->>'reason' AS reason
  FROM audit_logs
  WHERE action LIKE 'auth.%' AND created_at > now() - interval '1 hour'
  ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 50;"

A failed audit write does not fail the action; it logs audit: lost ... in felis-api and counts in felis_audit_write_failures_total (FelisAuditWriteFailing). The cause is almost always PostgreSQL (§16).

How long rows are kept

felis-api prunes the database a minute after it starts and every 6 hours after that, and logs retention: pruned spent rows with a count per table:

Rows	Deleted
sessions	30 days after they expired or were signed out
email codes, passkey challenges, setup links, op-login requests	30 days after they expired or were used
`/felis link` bind codes	30 days after they expired
account migrations that never completed	30 days after their last step (completed ones stay)
wrong-code windows (`otp_failure_windows`)	30 days after they began
`audit_logs`	once older than `[audit] retention`

[audit] retention defaults to 365d; it takes days (90d), months of 30 days (18mo) or forever, and refuses anything under 30d. The daily felis db backup bundles (§16) still hold the rows for as long as the bundles are kept. To keep audit rows past the retention, export them before they go:

sudo felis db audit-export -until 2026-01-01 -out /root/audit-2025.jsonl

-since and -until take a day (UTC midnight) or an RFC 3339 instant; the window is [since, until). Each line is one row as JSON, oldest first. The file is created 0600 and an existing file is never overwritten.

`felis breakGlass`: the recovery code and the OVERRIDE [VM-VERIFIED]

Once a staff account exists, sudo felis breakGlass asks which admin or owner is breaking the glass and mails that account's verified address a six-digit code through the same [smtp] relay as the sign-in codes. The code works for 10 minutes and five wrong ones end it. The console reads the relay password the way the watchdog does (the password_ref env var, else /etc/felis/smtp-password, else the felis-smtp Secret, else no AUTH), so a host whose k3s is down still gets its code, and the mail skips the API's max_per_hour budget. Only the right code makes the run a recovery attributed to that account; the mail says which host and OS user asked, so an admin who did not ask learns that root there is in other hands.

Every other ending leads to the typed OVERRIDE, and the screen says why: the name matches no staff account, the account has no verified address, no relay ([smtp] is not configured in felis.toml, or the Secret could not be read), the relay refused the mail, the code expired or took five wrong tries, or the operator typed OVERRIDE at the code prompt. Esc on either screen starts over with a new code. With the relay down recovery still works, as an unverified override that records the reason.

The audit row is break_glass.recovery or break_glass.root_override (break_glass.operator_create for a new Operator account), source break-glass. verified is true only for a run a code proved, which also carries verified_by: email_otp and code_sent_to. An override carries otp_skipped (unknown_admin, no_verified_email, no_relay, send_failed, code_expired, code_rejected, operator_skipped) and, where something failed, otp_skip_detail. Root can edit the row afterwards, so it records attribution without proving it.

sudo k3s kubectl -n felis exec deploy/felis-postgres -c postgres -- psql -U postgres felis -c "
  SELECT created_at, action, actor, payload->>'verified' AS verified,
         payload->>'otp_skipped' AS skipped, payload->>'otp_skip_detail' AS detail
  FROM audit_logs WHERE source = 'break-glass' ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 20;"

Optional: a Cloudflare rate limiting rule in front

The limits above live in the API, so they hold on any edge. Behind Cloudflare you can also stop floods before they reach the tunnel: Security → WAF → Rate limiting rules, match URI Path starts with /api/v1/auth/ on the console and op.console hostnames, count by IP, 30 requests per 10 seconds, action Block for 10 seconds (the Free plan's limits).

18. Server files: a change or an upload is refused

The panel's Files page is for the server's owner or an admin, and only while the server is fully stopped. Each call runs a one-shot felis files Job in the minecraft namespace, labelled app.kubernetes.io/managed-by=felis-files and felis.lolicon.best/files-mode=<list|read|write|mkdir|delete|rename|upload|unzip>. A listing or a read holds nothing. Every change (a save, a new file or folder, a rename, a delete, an upload, an unzip) holds the world for its Job (§3b), so a wake or a second change in the meantime gets 409 maintenance_in_progress. The panel sends uploads one at a time and greys its other changes until they finish.

Status	Code	Meaning	What to do
`409`	`not_stopped`	The game pod is still there, usually finishing its shutdown save	Retry once `kubectl -n minecraft get pods -l felis.lolicon.best/server=<name>` shows nothing
`409`	`maintenance_in_progress`	Another change, a backup, a restore or the reaper holds the world	§3b
`409`	`file_exists`	A new file, new folder, rename, or upload sent without replace found something at the path	Pick another name or clear the path; the panel offers Replace for an upload
`409`	`file_changed`	The file changed after the editor read it	The editor offers to load the latest or overwrite it
`400`	`bad_path`	The path leaves the world volume (`..`, an absolute path, a link pointing out), or it would move `server.properties`, `config` or `config/paper-global.yml`, or read `config/paper-global.yml`	Those three keep their names: the read path withholds their secrets by name, and `paper-global.yml` holds the proxy forwarding secret every server shares
`404`	`not_found`	The path, or a new folder's parent, is gone	Refresh the listing
`413`	`too_large`	A read over 1 MiB, a save over 256 KiB, or a one-request upload over 64 MiB	Upload a large file whole instead of editing it; the panel sends a file over 64 MiB in parts on its own
`411`	`length_required`	An upload without `Content-Length` (a chunked body)	Upload from the panel, or with `curl -T`, which sends the length
`400`	`upload_incomplete`	The body ended before its declared length	Retry; nothing was changed
`507`	`upload_staging_full`	Staging this upload would leave felis-api's staging filesystem under 10% free	Free space on the uploads volume
`507`	`volume_full`	The world volume ran out of space; the old file is left as it was	Delete files the server no longer needs, or grow its volume
`504`	`files_timeout`	felis-api stopped waiting after 90 s	See below: the Job may still finish
`503`	`files_unavailable`	felis-api runs without the file Job runner, or (for an upload) without a staging directory or its internal address	Check felis-api's startup log
`404`	`upload_not_found`	A large upload's session is gone: cancelled, already landed, idle for 6 hours, or felis-api restarted	Upload the file again
`409`	`upload_offset_mismatch`	A part did not start where the session ends (a lost answer, a second tab)	The panel reads where it stands and continues; nothing to do
`409`	`upload_busy`	Another part of the same upload is still arriving	Same
`413`	`part_too_large`	A part over 32 MiB, or past the size the upload began with	A client bug; upload from the panel
`409`	`upload_incomplete`	The commit came before every part had arrived	Same
`429`	`too_many_uploads`	The account already has 4 large uploads in progress	Finish or cancel one

An upload travels in two legs. The browser sends the body to felis-api, which stages it under /var/lib/felis/uploads/.file-staging on the uploads volume (felis-file-staging in the pod's temp directory when that volume is not mounted). The Job then fetches it once from felis-api's internal face, http://felis-api-internal.felis.svc.cluster.local:8081/api/v1/internal/file-uploads/<id>, with a one-time token, checks the size and SHA-256, and lands it. The staged copy is deleted once the Job has answered, and a felis-api restart empties the directory. A Job that cannot fetch its upload, or fetches bytes that do not match, fails and leaves the target as it was; the panel shows a server error it can retry. The Job's log names the cause:

kubectl -n minecraft get jobs -l felis.lolicon.best/server=<name>,app.kubernetes.io/managed-by=felis-files
kubectl -n minecraft logs job/<job>

After files_timeout the Job runs on to its own two-minute deadline and may still land the change. It keeps holding the world until it ends, so the next change waits on it with maintenance_in_progress; refresh the listing once it is gone to see whether the change landed. A Job is kept for two minutes after it ends, with its log.

A file over 64 MiB goes up in parts. The panel begins an upload session (POST …/files/uploads), which reserves room for the whole file on the staging filesystem at once, so an upload that starts can finish (507 upload_staging_full otherwise). It then sends 32 MiB parts, each under the Cloudflare edge's 100 MB body limit, retrying a part that fails and resuming from where the session ends; there is no size cap beyond the room. Starting the server midway costs only the commit, which needs it stopped again. The commit starts the Job and answers at once (202); the Job fetches the file the same way as above and runs up to 2 hours. A session belongs to the account and server it was begun for, and one untouched for 6 hours is dropped (felis-api logs dropped N upload session(s) left idle). A Job that fails before it has every byte leaves the session, so committing again does not mean sending it again. Folders cannot be uploaded: the panel asks for a .zip instead, because loose files cut off midway would leave half a world.

Unzip (POST …/files/unzip, .zip only) extracts into a hidden .felis-unzip-* folder beside the archive and moves the result into place only once every entry has been written and checked, so a failure changes nothing and the working folder is removed. It checks, before writing a byte, that no entry leaves the folder or is a link (archive_unsafe, archive_symlink), that the archive does not put a file where the server has a folder or the reverse (type_conflict), and that the volume has room (volume_full); an entry whose size differs from what the archive declares ends archive_invalid. Names stored in GBK, as Windows zips in a Chinese locale have them, are read as such. Without replace, an archive that would overwrite files ends file_exists with the list, which the panel shows for confirmation before running it again with replace.

Large uploads and unzips run in the background: they keep going when the page is closed, and GET …/files/ops lists the one running and those that ended in the last 30 minutes, with bytes done and, on failure, the code above or job_failed with the Job's condition (DeadlineExceeded after 2 hours). Their Jobs carry felis.lolicon.best/files-async=true. A Job that fails without a result keeps its log for 30 minutes:

kubectl -n minecraft get jobs -l felis.lolicon.best/server=<name>,felis.lolicon.best/files-async=true

Downloading a file or folder (POST …/files/download) is an export (§10, "Downloading a backup or the world"): a felis-export Job with felis.lolicon.best/export-mode=files reads the file, or zips the folder, from the world read-only and felis-api streams it to the browser. It needs the server stopped and holds the world until the download ends. config/paper-global.yml is refused as a file and left out of a folder, and server.properties goes out with rcon.password redacted, matched by the file itself so a link to either is guarded too; world and backup exports filter the same two files. Two per user at a time, four across the install, 30 per user per hour (429 export_busy).

Every change is audited as file.write, file.mkdir, file.delete, file.rename (with to), file.upload (with size_bytes, sha256 and overwrite, in one request or in parts), file.unzip (with overwrite) or file.download, with server_name set to <server>:<path>:

sudo k3s kubectl -n felis exec deploy/felis-postgres -c postgres -- psql -U postgres felis -c "
  SELECT created_at, actor, action, server_name, payload
  FROM audit_logs WHERE action LIKE 'file.%' ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 20;"

[GO-TESTED: internal/fileedit, handlers_files_test.go, handlers_fileops_test.go, cmd/felis/files_test.go, TestExpireFileSessions, internal/maintenance.] [VM-TESTED: a pod labelled as a files Job in minecraft reaches felis-api-internal:8081; a 256 KiB save's content, split across six variables, lands byte for byte through the real binary, where one 140 KB variable fails with argument list too long. An upload through the API, both legs end to end, has not been run on a cluster.]

19. Scheduled tasks: a run is skipped, missed or failed

A server's owner (or an admin) keeps up to 20 scheduled tasks on it, on the panel's Scheduled tasks page (/api/v1/servers/{name}/schedules). Each one sends a console command, restarts, stops, starts or backs up the server, once a day at a set time or every 15 minutes to 12 hours, on the chosen weekdays, in an IANA time zone (the browser's by default). A restart, stop or backup may warn the players in game (say) 1 to 30 minutes ahead. felis-api runs the tasks itself: a loop every 15 seconds, so a task starts within about 15 seconds of its time, and the database hands each run to one felis-api only.

What each action does:

Action	Server running	Server stopped
command	runs it over RCON (a leading `/` is dropped)	skipped
restart	stops the pod, then starts it	skipped
stop	stops it	skipped
start	skipped (a start that `Failed` is started over)	starts it, as the panel's start does (running-server cap, retiring server, busy world)
backup	stops it, takes the same backup Job as "Back up now", then starts it again	takes the backup

A step has a deadline: the pod must stop within 15 minutes, the backup Job must end within 45, and the start is given 15. A restart or backup that cannot finish still starts the server again when it was running before, so a failed backup never leaves a world offline.

The row's last result says how the latest run went:

`last_result`	`last_detail`	What to do
`ok`	empty, or the reply of a console command	nothing
`skipped`	`the server has a new owner since this schedule was saved; save it again to use it`	the server changed owner (claim, account migration, admin). The task switched itself off; the new owner reviews it and saves it to turn it back on
`skipped`	`the server was not running`, `the server was already stopped`, `the server was already running`, `the server has no world yet`, `the server is being given up or deleted`, `the server no longer exists`, and for a start `the cluster is at its running-server cap` or `the world is busy with …`	the run had nothing to act on; the next run tries again
`missed`	`felis-api was not running at the scheduled time`	felis-api was down more than 10 minutes past the time. The run is dropped, so a restart never lands hours late; the next one runs as usual
`failed`	`felis-api stopped in the middle of this run`	felis-api restarted during the run's first step (the claim was over 2 minutes old); check that the server is in the state you want
`failed`	`the server did not stop within 15 minutes`	see §1 and §2 for a pod that hangs; the backup did not run
`failed`	`another operation kept the world busy for 15 minutes`	a restore, file change or another backup held the world (§3b)
`failed`	`the backup failed: …`, `the backup did not finish within 45 minutes`, `the backup store is full; ask an administrator to free space`	§10 for backup Jobs; the Backups page shows the Job
`failed`	`could not start the server again: …` (after a restart or a backup)	the server stopped and could not be started again: the running-server cap, a server being given up, or a world still busy after 15 minutes of retries. Start it from the panel once the cause is gone (§1, §3b)
`failed`	`the server console could not be reached`, `the command failed: …`	the server's RCON (§1c)

"Run now" starts a run at once, including on a switched-off task, and leaves the next planned run where it was. While a run is in progress (run_state is claimed, stopping, backing_up or starting) the task cannot be edited, deleted or run again (409 schedule_running).

A time the clock skips at a daylight-saving change runs an hour early (the offset before the jump applies); a time it repeats runs once, the first time. A time zone the host no longer knows runs in UTC. Deleting a server drops its tasks, and a new server of the same name starts with none. The audit actions are schedule.create, schedule.update, schedule.delete, schedule.run_now (by a person) and schedule.run (every finished run, with its result and detail).

[GO-TESTED: TestScheduleNextRun, TestScheduleInputValidation, TestScheduleRunnerBackup, TestScheduleRunnerRestart, TestScheduleRunnerStaleClaim; PG-TESTED: TestScheduleStoreRunCAS, TestDueSchedules, TestSchedulesFollowTheServer]

Quick reference: symptom → section

Symptom	Section
Where to start: what is up, what is wrong, what to send when asking for help	§0
Stuck `Starting`, never `Running`	§1
`Starting` with `PodNotReady` (image? PVC? boot?)	§1a
RCON secret/auth/port errors	§1b, §1c
Phase `Failed`	§2
Players land in lobby / wrong place	§3, §4
Wake refused / rate-limited (403/409/429/503)	§3a
`maintenance_in_progress`; server won't start after a restore	§3b
Routing disabled, offline-mode	§4
Panel 401/403; fails-closed; audience error	§5
Local password login rejected	§5c
Internal callers 401 (service token)	§6
Link/claim 400/409/412/403/404	§7
Build push 400 / SA denied / egress hang / Failed / executor ImagePullBackOff	§8, §8e
Registry push/pull unreachable	§9
World deleted unexpectedly / backup skipped	§10
Reaper `awaiting_stop` stays above 0; `corrupt=` / backup shown as damaged; `orphan_archives`	§10
Backup or world download refused or cut off (`export_busy`, `export_expired`, `export_unavailable`)	§10
Idle auto-stop not firing; player count 0; `PlayersCounted=False`	§11
A config field seems ignored	§12
PVC left behind after delete	§13
Node out of disk; pods evicted / ImagePullBackOff	§13b
Which metric to scrape	§14
An alert mail from the watchdog; nothing is mailed when something breaks	§14
The host went down and nothing noticed; `NO HEARTBEAT` at install; `felis-watchdog-failed` in the journal; `state.json.unreadable-*`	§14
`FelisOperatorDown` / `FelisAPIDown` / `FelisLoginGateDown` / `FelisReconcileStuck`	§14, §1, §2
Upgrade / roll back a bad control-plane image	§15
`image_change_unconfirmed` / `image_not_in_registry` / `registry_unavailable`; move a world to a newer Minecraft	§15b
Database backup overdue / `FelisDBBackupStale` / panel shows Never backed up	§16
`pre-migration backup failed, nothing applied` during an upgrade	§16
Undo a mistaken change / restore the control-plane database	§16
Host lost: rebuild from a database bundle	§16
`felis-postgres did not become ready`; `kubectl exec` finds no database pod	§16
`the off-site copy last completed ... ago` / `NO OFF-SITE COPY` / reaper `awaiting_offsite` stays above 0	§16, §10
Sign-in 429 `rate_limited` for everyone at once	§17
429 `mail_rate_limited` / `FelisMailBudgetExhausted`	§17
Right code refused; `otp_account_locked` / `FelisOTPAccountLocked`	§17
`FelisSignInFailures` / who is guessing, from where	§17
`FelisAuditWriteFailing`	§17
`felis breakGlass` sends no code / shows `Root override`; `otp_skipped` in the audit	§17
How long sessions, codes and audit rows are kept; export audit rows	§17
Files page: a change, upload or unzip refused (`file_exists`, `bad_path`, `too_large`, `upload_staging_full`, `upload_not_found`, `volume_full`, `archive_unsafe`, `job_failed`, `files_timeout`)	§18
A scheduled task shows `skipped`, `missed` or `failed`; a task switched itself off after an owner change	§19

Source: docs/troubleshooting.md.

Felis Troubleshooting Checklist ​

How to read this document ​

0. First look: felis status, felis doctor, felis support-bundle ​

1. Server is stuck in Starting and never becomes Running ​

1a. PodNotReady — pod never goes ready ​

1b. RconSecretUnavailable — RCON secret missing or malformed ​

1c. RconNotReachable — RCON dial or auth failed ​

2. Server is in Failed ​

3. Players can't join / get sent to the wrong place ​

3a. Wake-on-join is refused, slow, or rate-limited ​

3b. Wake, restore, backup or file change refused with maintenance_in_progress ​

4. Routing is disabled even though servers are up (online-mode coupling) ​

5. Web panel returns 401 / 403 (Zero-Trust / Cloudflare Access) ​

5a. Staff routes 403 on a local IP URL ​

5c. Local-password login fails or is silently rejected ​

6. Internal API rejects Velocity / proxy callers (service-token) ​

Rotating a token ​

7. Account-link and claim API errors ​

8. Image build fails (Kaniko, spec §14/§16) ​

8a. Build push rejected at submission with 400 ​

8b. Build Job's ServiceAccount can do nothing (RBAC "denial" by design) ​

8c. Build hangs then fails fetching base image / packages ​

8d. Build reaches Failed phase ​

8e. Build Pods never start: executor images and the scan DBs ​

8f. Build isolation model and residual risk ​

9. Registry push/pull failures (spec §15) ​

10. World reaper: false-deletes and skipped backups (spec §18) ​

What a backup contains ​

The backup-before-delete invariant ​

A failed reaper Job ​

On-demand backups (Back up now) ​

Deleting one backup ​

Downloading a backup or the world (export) ​

Every world at once: felis backup-now ​

Scheduled backups (daily restore points) ​

Exemptions (world never reaped) ​

Pre-reap warnings (the warn_before offsets) ​

Genuine false-delete risk vectors ​

Where worlds are read from (hostPath resolution) ​

11. Idle auto-stop never fires; player count always shows 0 ​

12. A configuration field seems to be ignored ​

12b. A newer field never reaches an already-installed system server (felis converge) ​

13. World PVC survives after I deleted the MinecraftServer ​

13b. Node runs out of disk: what survives, and how to recover ​

13c. The host's address, name or clock changed ​

13d. k3s certificates expire after a year ​

14. Health alerts, and metrics for diagnosis (spec §23) ​

The watchdog: what mails the owners ​

The heartbeat: what notices the host itself going down ​

When the watchdog itself fails ​

Metrics ​

Scraping ​

Alert rules ​

15. Control-plane upgrades, and rolling back a bad one ​

15b. Game images, pinned builds, and moving a world to a newer Minecraft ​

15c. The installer builds on the host although it installs a release ​

16. Control-plane database backups and disaster recovery ​

What runs, and where the bundles go ​

Is the newest backup fresh? ​

felis-postgres is not running, or never became ready ​

Check a bundle ​

Restore on the same host (undo a mistake) ​

Roll back an upgrade that broke the database ​

Whole-host disaster recovery: what comes back, and from where ​

Rebuild on a new host (the old one is gone) ​

Keep a copy somewhere else ​

FELIS_PRE_MIGRATE_BACKUP=0 ​

17. Sign-in refused: 429 limits, no mail relay, account code locks, failed sign-ins ​

rate_limited: one address called the doors too often ​

mail_rate_limited: the install-wide mail budget is spent ​

mail_unavailable: no mail relay ​

Relay refused for lacking TLS ​

otp_account_locked: ten wrong codes in 24 hours ​

Who tried: the audit trail ​

How long rows are kept ​

felis breakGlass: the recovery code and the OVERRIDE [VM-VERIFIED] ​

Optional: a Cloudflare rate limiting rule in front ​

18. Server files: a change or an upload is refused ​

19. Scheduled tasks: a run is skipped, missed or failed ​

Quick reference: symptom → section ​

Felis Troubleshooting Checklist

How to read this document

0. First look: `felis status`, `felis doctor`, `felis support-bundle`

1. Server is stuck in `Starting` and never becomes `Running`

1a. `PodNotReady` — pod never goes ready

1b. `RconSecretUnavailable` — RCON secret missing or malformed

1c. `RconNotReachable` — RCON dial or auth failed

2. Server is in `Failed`

3. Players can't join / get sent to the wrong place

3a. Wake-on-join is refused, slow, or rate-limited

3b. Wake, restore, backup or file change refused with `maintenance_in_progress`

4. Routing is disabled even though servers are up (online-mode coupling)

5. Web panel returns 401 / 403 (Zero-Trust / Cloudflare Access)

5a. Staff routes 403 on a local IP URL

5c. Local-password login fails or is silently rejected

6. Internal API rejects Velocity / proxy callers (service-token)

Rotating a token

7. Account-link and claim API errors

8. Image build fails (Kaniko, spec §14/§16)

8a. Build push rejected at submission with `400`

8b. Build Job's ServiceAccount can do nothing (RBAC "denial" by design)

8c. Build hangs then fails fetching base image / packages

8d. Build reaches `Failed` phase

8e. Build Pods never start: executor images and the scan DBs

8f. Build isolation model and residual risk

9. Registry push/pull failures (spec §15)

10. World reaper: false-deletes and skipped backups (spec §18)

What a backup contains

The backup-before-delete invariant

A failed reaper Job

On-demand backups (Back up now)

Deleting one backup

Downloading a backup or the world (export)

Every world at once: `felis backup-now`

Scheduled backups (daily restore points)

Exemptions (world never reaped)

Pre-reap warnings (the `warn_before` offsets)

Genuine false-delete risk vectors

Where worlds are read from (hostPath resolution)

11. Idle auto-stop never fires; player count always shows 0

12. A configuration field seems to be ignored

12b. A newer field never reaches an already-installed system server (`felis converge`)

13. World PVC survives after I deleted the MinecraftServer

13b. Node runs out of disk: what survives, and how to recover

13c. The host's address, name or clock changed

13d. k3s certificates expire after a year

14. Health alerts, and metrics for diagnosis (spec §23)

The watchdog: what mails the owners

The heartbeat: what notices the host itself going down

When the watchdog itself fails

Metrics

Scraping

Alert rules

15. Control-plane upgrades, and rolling back a bad one

15b. Game images, pinned builds, and moving a world to a newer Minecraft

15c. The installer builds on the host although it installs a release

16. Control-plane database backups and disaster recovery

What runs, and where the bundles go

Is the newest backup fresh?

felis-postgres is not running, or never became ready

Check a bundle

Restore on the same host (undo a mistake)

Roll back an upgrade that broke the database

Whole-host disaster recovery: what comes back, and from where

Rebuild on a new host (the old one is gone)

Keep a copy somewhere else

`FELIS_PRE_MIGRATE_BACKUP=0`

17. Sign-in refused: 429 limits, no mail relay, account code locks, failed sign-ins

`rate_limited`: one address called the doors too often

`mail_rate_limited`: the install-wide mail budget is spent

`mail_unavailable`: no mail relay

Relay refused for lacking TLS

`otp_account_locked`: ten wrong codes in 24 hours

Who tried: the audit trail

How long rows are kept

`felis breakGlass`: the recovery code and the OVERRIDE [VM-VERIFIED]

Optional: a Cloudflare rate limiting rule in front

18. Server files: a change or an upload is refused

19. Scheduled tasks: a run is skipped, missed or failed

Quick reference: symptom → section